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ABSTRACT 
 
The United Nations “Rule of Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Truth Commissions” 
is one of the official policy documents within the transitional justice area to be 
recommended to post-conflict countries interested in establishing a mechanism which 
can provide some form of accountability for massive human rights violations. Through 
a victim-centred approach based on the truth-telling exercises and the uncovering of 
factual evidence a collective historical narrative is produced, some form of 
accountability is achieved, and reconciliation and personal healing can be advanced. 
This thesis argues that such claims are based on intuitive and/or taken for granted 
truths and that they are part of a discourse that has been articulated in specific ways 
to legitimate some understandings and exclude others. Through a genealogical 
analysis based in the work of M. Foucault, an exploration of the productive power of 
discourse and of the United Nations as a system of formation of certain truth-claims 
is presented. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2006 the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
published a series of documents under the heading Rule of Law Tools for Post-Conflict 
States. This series includes a document on Truth Commissions as one of the 
mechanisms of the so-called transitional justice approach, which is recommended for 
countries emerging from violent conflict and regime change, and their usual corollary 
of massive and/or systematic crimes.  
 
These UN tools are the expression of a normative wave that in the last three decades 
has resulted in an explosion of initiatives in the area of transitional justice. According to 
numbers provided by Amnesty International, only in the last 10 years, at least 17 
countries have established truth commissions1. National and international NGO´s2, 
governments and major international organizations such as the United Nations, have 
all been eager sponsors of these mechanisms. Most research done in the area of truth 
commissions has been focused in analysing individual country results, checking 
whether the stated objectives have been achieved and how, or studying whether truth 
commissions in general live up to the expectations generated by their existence 
(Hayner, 1994, Kim, 2009). Yet, for all their popularity, many a critical research has 
also voiced unease for what appears to be unbounded enthusiasm for these 
processes (Kent, 2011, Mendeloff, 2004, Miller, 2008, Paige, 2009, Paris et al., 2010, 
Subotic, 2012). Trying to limit the expectations with regard to the capabilities of truth 
commissions and presenting a more sober view of the whole subject has been a key 
concern. More limited, though, has been research studying how the present 
understanding of truth commission has emerged and/or how it interacts with other 
discourses. This point becomes significant when an important sponsor of these 
processes is such a relevant international player (such as the United Nations). 
Whether we might doubt or not the present abilities of the UN to lead international 
politics and diplomacy, it remains an important source of legitimacy. By sanctioning 
specific mechanisms to deal with post-conflict states, and providing strategic, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  http://www.amnesty.org/en/international-­‐justice/issues/truth-­‐commissions	  2	  Such	  as:	  International	  Center	  for	  Transitional	  Justice,	  US	  Institute	  of	  Peace	  (RoL	  Initiative)	  and	  NGO´s	  dealing	  with	  human	  rights	  such	  as	  Amnesty	  International,	  Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  and	  many	  others.	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economic and logistic assistance in these processes, the UN endorses them and 
becomes an important agent in the general articulation of this discourse.  
 
Yet, truth or rather its operational instrument, truth commissions, is a notably difficult 
endeavour. Within the UN, the discourse on truth commissions is articulated with a 
vocabulary of human rights. Specifically, the right to truth/know and the right to justice 
have grown alongside the understanding of truth commissions. In a post-conflict 
situation, which is the defined field of a truth´s commission quest, searching for truth 
and/or achieving criminal accountability are understood to be essential for re-
establishing the administration of justice and building a peaceful democratic state. Yet, 
would these objectives be more relevant than the search for socio-economic reform, 
which usually lies at the base of most conflicts? Why would these “tools” be the most 
appropriate ones? How has been the process from which these understandings have 
emerged? 
 
Based on the present UN understanding of truth commissions as expressed in its 
official document-tool on the subject3 this thesis aspires to answer: 
Ø What is the discourse that underpins the United Nation understanding of truth 
and its operational instrument, truth commissions?  
Ø How did this particular articulation of the discourse came about and, what are 
the consequences of this choice? 
 
Answering these questions becomes relevant in order to illuminate the process by 
which the UN articulates specific understandings on subjects and grants legitimacy to 
certain practices.   
 
A post-structuralist approach based on discourse will serve as an anchor for the 
research. Specifically, a genealogical analysis inspired by the work of M. Foucault will 
be conducted. Post-structuralism focus on language does not equal the adoption of an 
ontological position divorced from materiality, “the point is not to disregard material 
facts but to study how these are produced and prioritized” (Hansen 2006: 22). Rather, 
it attempts to highlight their interaction and how our understanding of phenomena is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Rule	  of	  Law	  Tools	  for	  Post-­‐Conflict	  States:	  Truth	  Commissions	  /	  UN	  2006	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necessarily mediated by language. Post-structuralism also rejects a rigid causal 
epistemology (which it sees as a particular discourse of knowledge) because it 
understands knowledge as historically and politically situated.  
 
Genealogies do not profess to render an historical account of the past, but to describe 
how the present has been informed by contingent understandings and turn of events, 
in other words, how the present becomes logically possible (Bartelson 1995: 8). These 
contingencies far from demonstrating a straightforward evolution of discourses, ideas 
or practices, illustrate a more intricate path, one more likely to be speckled by power 
interactions than to be the result of an inevitable refinement of rationality. This 
interpretation of a genealogy is inspired by M. Foucault´s works and by succeeding 
waves of scholars that have also applied this approach (Bartelson, 1995, Carabine, 
2001, Graham, 2005, Hansen, 2006, Neumann, 2001, Tamboukou, 1999, Vucetic, 
2011). Based on these premises, truth commissions will be studied as a discourse and 
a practice. 
 
In order to achieve its aims, this thesis is organized in five chapters. The first chapter 
presents a literature review of the subject of transitional justice and briefly summarizes 
research done in the area of truth commissions. Chapter two discusses the theoretical 
framework of the thesis and it also includes the concepts to be utilised in the analysis. 
The third chapter deals with the methodology used to conduct the genealogical 
analysis. The analytical part is further divided in two chapters: chapter four explaining 
the context from which the discourse on truth commissions has crystallized, and 
chapter five which is the analysis of the discourse itself. Finally the sixth chapter states 
the conclusions of the paper. 
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1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This review of the literature in transitional justice in general and truth commissions in 
particular has as its objective to provide a summary of the field and to locate this thesis 
within a research corpus. Given that this thesis aspires to provide a genealogical 
account of the UN understanding of truth commissions, the literature review will be 
organized around the following items: genealogical accounts, contemporary research 
and main conceptual paradigms.  
 
Genealogical accounts are important because they provide a background for the 
arguments presented and bring to light the foundational myths of the field. A review of 
contemporary scholarship creates the space for this thesis while an assessment of the 
conceptual paradigms that animate the field of truth commissions is relevant because 
in the last years and given the mixed results achieved by numerous commissions, 
many authors have also written extensively on the conceptual basis of the field in a 
kind of soul-searching coming of age. Articles against and for the healing or 
reconciliatory power of truth telling at an individual and societal level abound, 
accompanied by cautionary tales about the need to restrict the reliance in 
immeasurable benefits. The explanation of these conceptual arguments will further 
help to ground the analytical work that is conducted later on. 
 
A last point to clarify is that for the purposes of this review and although the terms 
transitional justice/truth commission do not refer to the same subject (as truth 
commissions are but one of the mechanisms contemplated within the transitional 
justice field), the genealogical account collapses both because for historical reasons 
truth commissions are understood to conceptually herald the birth of the field since 
trials4 as such (which is the other key transitional justice mechanism) have been 
around for quite a while before. 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Reparations,	  lustration,	  vetting	  and	  institutional	  reforms	  are	  the	  other	  mechanisms	  that	  presently	  encompass	  transitional	  justice.	  However	  this	  thesis	  does	  not	  dwell	  on	  their	  conceptual	  histories	  as	  they	  are	  not	  relevant	  for	  this	  particular	  analysis.	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1. 1. Genealogical Accounts  
Once upon a time in a Europe galvanized by the savagery of war an unprecedented 
event was to take place. A series of tribunals was to be organized to re-instate justice 
as understood by civilized men by determining accountability and punishing those 
responsible for the crimes committed. The Nuremberg trials were to be conducted 
from November 1945 – October 1946, inaugurating a new era, subsequently delayed 
by the advent of the cold war, in the historical development of justice. Although the 
Nuremberg trials are to be described as representative of the so-called “victor´s 
justice”, these trials represent (in some genealogical accounts) the historical 
antecedents of the transitional justice field (Hazan, 2006, Teitel, 2003). According to 
these accounts, the nature of the crimes committed by the Nazi regime5 were so 
horrific (Holocaust) that a new type of judiciary proceedings were needed thus giving 
rise to what was later to develop into international law with its focus on “national rights 
and duties within the new international community” (p. 32) (Teitel, 2000). Other 
authors like G. Bass (cited in Eisikovits 20116) explain the Nuremberg trials by 
highlighting them as the success of American legalist tradition which had “fought the 
war in defence of political freedom (…) This freedom depends on upholding the ideals 
of the rule of law (…) which require the individualization of guilt and giving the 
defendants a fair chance to answer the charges against them” (Eisikovits, 2011).Thus 
we found both the rule of law and the development of international law at the core of 
these interpretations. 
 
Other accounts7 situate the emergence of this new justice paradigm at the beginning 
of the 80´s with the end of the cold-war and the democratization wave that sweep 
through both Latin America and some of the previous republics of the ex- Soviet Union 
(Kritz, 1995, Lutz and Sikkink, 2001, Paris et al., 2010, Wilson, 2001). Accordingly 
Kritz states: “When the communist world began its collapse in the late 1980´s and the 
post-Cold War period opened, newly democratic nations (…) looked to democracies, 
specially the United States, for help in creating democratic institutions and the complex 
foundation of a citizenry of democrats so necessary to transverse the inevitable rough 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Here	  we	  must	  include	  the	  Nazi	  and	  the	  Japanese	  governments	  as	  these	  ”victor´s	  trials”	  were	  conducted	  both	  in	  Nuremberg	  and	  in	  Tokyo.	  6	  	  Accessed	  Nov.	  22,	  2012	  http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-­‐transitional/	  7	  While	  some	  of	  these	  accounts	  may	  mention	  the	  Nuremberg	  antecedent,	  they	  instead	  prefer	  to	  focus	  in	  worldwide	  political	  developments	  of	  the	  80´s	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waters ahead” (p.xv) (Kritz, 1995). According to these accounts transitions to 
democracy and away from both authoritarian and communist regimes explain the 
nascence of a field. Yet authors like A. Paige (2009) have argued that this 
understanding of the challenges facing new regimes has been explained within a very 
specific framework, one that situates political dilemmas as legal-institutional 
challenges of a temporary nature. Transitions are to be understood as “deeply 
enmeshed with political problems that were legal-institutional and, relatively, short term 
in nature (…) So short term, in fact, that they could be dealt with specifically during a 
transitional period” (p.333) (Paige, 2009). 
 
While acknowledging the general geopolitical climate of the 80´s, some authors have 
singled out the Latin American democratization wave (Bell, 2009, Garcia-Godos, 2008, 
Grandin and Miller Klubock, 2007, Orentlicher, 2007, Paige, 2009) as the genesis of 
the truth commissions surge (and the transitional justice field). Others (Grandin and 
Miller Klubock, 2007, Paige, 2009) specifically argue that the Argentinian inquiry 
commission8 into the fate of the “desaparecidos” (1983) was to be not only the 
pioneering standard9, but also argue that its main theorists sat up the conceptual 
foundations of the field (even if the phenomenon of truth commissions as such really 
takes off after the much-publicized South African Truth & Reconciliation Commission 
in 1995). As Grandin & Lubock state: “Heavily influenced by Emile Durkheim´s 
arguments about the role of the rule of law in the formalization of social solidarity, 
these legal theorists (Carlos Nino, Jaime Malamud-Goti and Jose Zalaquett10) laid the 
philosophical foundation of subsequent truth commissions” (p.2) (parentheses added) 
(Grandin and Miller Klubock, 2007).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Formed	  after	  democracy	  was	  restored	  in	  Argentina	  in	  1983,	  the	  National	  Commission	  on	  the	  Disappearance	  of	  Persons	  	  (CONADEP)	  was	  chartered	  to	  investigate	  the	  fates	  of	  the	  thousands	  who	  disappeared	  during	  the	  military	  rule.	  The	  commission	  was	  to	  receive	  depositions	  and	  evidence	  concerning	  these	  events,	  and	  pass	  the	  information	  to	  the	  courts,	  in	  those	  cases	  where	  crimes	  had	  been	  committed.	  The	  commission's	  report	  would	  not	  extend,	  however,	  to	  determine	  responsibility,	  only	  to	  deliver	  an	  unbiased	  chronicle	  of	  the	  events.	  	  9	  In	  Bolivia	  was	  established	  the	  National	  Inquiry	  on	  Dissapeared	  People	  in	  1982,	  that	  is	  before	  the	  Argentinian	  commission,	  but	  due	  to	  its	  limited	  scope	  and	  consequences	  is	  not	  commonly	  highlighted	  in	  the	  literature	  10	  Jose	  Zalaquett	  was	  the	  theoretical	  architect	  behind	  the	  Chilean	  Truth	  and	  Reconciliation	  Commission	  of	  1990,	  yet	  he	  was	  part	  of	  the	  group	  that	  in	  1989	  was	  reflecting	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  democratic	  transitions	  at	  the	  
seminal	  Aspen	  Institute	  Conference	  	  (see	  PAIGE,	  A.	  2009.	  How	  "Transitions"	  Reshaped	  Human	  Rights:	  A	  Conceptual	  History	  of	  Transitional	  Justice.	  Human	  Rights	  Quarterly,	  31,	  321-­‐	  367.)	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Yet, still other historical accounts claim that this phenomenon is not modern at all and 
that the processes of transitional justice can be seen “in the wake of restorations of the 
Athenian democracy in 411 and then again in 403 BC” (Elster, 2004). In an 
explanation geared to show the variety of transitional justice cases11 and the possibility 
of nations learning by experience, Elster identifies the genesis of democratic 
transitional justice in Athens in a way that many conceptual historians find 
controversial since it conflates present understanding of the terms with imputed 
meanings to long gone actors. As A. Paige explains, “Whatever meanings these 
various practices may have held for the historical actors involved (none of whom had 
ever heard the phrase “transitional justice”) get swept into a universal, homogeneous 
conception of transitional justice, whose only meaning is identical to our conventional, 
twenty-first century understanding of it” (p. 328) (Paige, 2009)  
 
Nonetheless, whether representative of the purportedly age-old democratic flair 
demonstrated in Athens or an evidence of the post-Cold War pax-neoliberal (Grandin 
and Miller Klubock, 2007), this sample of historical accounts of the transitional justice 
field offers a varied understanding that probably reflects more the intellectual range of 
the explanations provided than any truer essence to be exposed. As such, the 
genealogical account attempted here is not concerned with the truest historical 
account, but faithful to the Foucauldian logic that animates it, it looks to the historical 
contingencies that nest such interpretations. This is not the path commonly taken 
when studying truth commissions.  
 
 
1.2. Contemporary Research:  Impact studies, Ethnographical Research and 
Conceptual Debates  
As previously mentioned, the lion´s share of empirical research has been concentrated 
around the impact of transitional justice/truth commission processes in either a single-
case manner or have been cross-comparisons among commissions or regions 
(Hayner, 1994, Hayner, 2011, James, 2012, Kent, 2011, Kim, 2009, Kritz, 1995, 
Mazzei, 2011, Wilson, 2001).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Elster	  approach	  singles	  out	  memory	  and	  retribution	  as	  the	  essential	  drivers	  of	  transitional	  justice	  
	   23	  
 
These studies generally evaluate whether the stated objectives of the truth 
commission have been achieved and how, yet methodological challenges abound as 
it´s enormously difficult to operationalize or quantify the concepts used: “For better or 
worse, our assessment of the impacts of truth commissions will have to continue to 
include qualitative, case-specific comparisons, in order to fully understand the 
dynamics”(Hayner2011).
 
Those authors who believe in the positive impact of truth commissions tend to highlight 
the specific results of some commissions in achieving some institutional reforms, 
reparations, vetting or apologies (Hayner, 2011). But since it is difficult to disaggregate 
these results from other general societal dynamics, how do you demonstrate that they 
are the explicit impact of the commission? As P. Hazan (2006) writes “the specific 
effect of such institutions (truth commissions) must be isolated from other factors in 
which they play a part, such as the political evolution of a country” (p.28) (parentheses 
added). Maybe this is why other authors (Dimitrijević, 2006, Godwin Phelps, 2001, 
Urban Walker, 2007) tend to stress more the moral implications and effects of truth-
searching/telling for societies. Moral philosopher M. Urban Walker (2007) writing about 
truth commissions argues: “When individuals or institutions are not allowed to silence 
the less powerful or the violated, and are compelled to listen to and to account to those 
once dominated or violated, then all parties find themselves within a moral field” (p. 
233) (highlighted in original text) 
 
Apart from impact studies, the ethnographic trend in empirical research has been 
much more concerned with the subtle nuances of local truth commission processes 
and the desire to go more deeply into people´s interpretations of events. In a bottom-
up approach, these types of studies tend to be more critical to the universalizing 
claims of transitional justice/truth commissions and are more inclined to focus on 
social and cultural variations (Eastmond and Selimovic, 2012, Ekern, 2010, Kent, 
2011, Millar, 2010). In an article about his experiences from El Salvador and 
Guatemala´s truth commissions, S. Ekern (2010) states “the need for using more 
social and historical contextualization when analyzing violence in non-Western settings 
as well as for increased social and political sensitivity in designing policies that legalize 
human rights “(p. 220) 
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Nevertheless, more than 30 years after the first so-called truth commission12 has been 
conducted (Argentina, 1983) conceptual debates around core transitional justice/truth 
commission notions abound. N. Kritz (1995) in his pioneering compendium on 
transitional justice dedicates the first volume of the series (General Considerations) to 
“political, historical, legal, psychological and moral perspectives (of transitional justice)” 
(parentheses added).  
 
In another review of more than “a 100 TJ (transitional justice) related studies 
consulted” Paris et al. come to the conclusion that “reliable, empirical knowledge on 
the state-level impact of TJ is still limited” (p.331). Yet, they think that this does not 
disqualify the “moral and legal rationales for pursuing these policies” (p.353) (Paris et 
al., 2010). While N. Dimitrijevich discards the “familiar arguments of condemnation, 
ascription of guilt, distribution of blame, healing, reconciliation, or even the restoration 
of equality between victims´ and perpetrators groups” to propose a single moral 
justification for the need of truth commissions: “rebuilding the lost sense of justice in 
the community of perpetrators” (p. 369) (Dimitrijević, 2006) 
 
On the other hand, more critical type of reviews questioning the alleged universal 
claims of transitional justice/truth commissions have been carried out by Daly (2008), 
Hazan (2006), Mendeloff (2004), Parlevliet (1998), Waldorf (2012) and Wenstein 
(2011) .The much-cited article of D. Mendeloff (2004) “Truth-seeking, Truth-telling, and 
Post-conflict Peacebuilding: Curb the enthusiasm?” concludes that the value of truth-
telling is likely limited, while P. Hazan (2006) summarizes these limitations by 
highlighting both the methodological obstacles in studying transitional justice 
mechanisms, and the “ideological nature of the debates around it”.  
 
After 5 years as Co-editor-in-chief of the International Journal of Transitional Justice, 
H. Wenstein (2011) summarizing the state of the field concludes in his last editorial13: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  The	  Argentinian	  commission	  alongside	  the	  ones	  established	  in	  Bolivia	  (1982)	  and	  Uganda	  (1974)	  were	  originally	  called	  inquiries	  into	  forced	  disappearances	  and	  although	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  facts	  was	  the	  objective	  of	  the	  investigation,	  they	  were	  not	  then	  called	  or	  identified	  as	  truth	  commissions	  as	  presently	  understood.	  13	  This	  last	  editorial	  was	  tellingly	  titled:	  “The	  Myth	  of	  Closure,	  the	  Illusion	  of	  Reconciliation:	  Final	  Thoughts	  on	  Five	  Years	  as	  Co-­‐Editor-­‐in-­‐Chief”	  WEINSTEIN,	  H.	  M.	  2011.	  Editorial	  Note:	  The	  Myth	  of	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“The international community needs to temper its goals and recognize that these 
processes unfold over a long period of time and are marked by very small steps. I 
suggest that we need to look more realistically at what trials, truth commissions and 
memorials actually accomplish and value them for the very specific and limited goals 
they may achieve”.  
 
With regard to the work conducted here, and apart from the articles written by A. Paige 
(2009) How "Transitions" Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of 
Transitional Justice”, and R. Teitel (2003) “Transitional Justice Genealogy”, the author 
of this thesis is not aware of any other genealogical studies been conducted neither on 
truth commissions, nor on the UN work around it. Paige´s article investigates the 
conceptual origins and boundaries of the field “The field of “transitional justice”—an 
international web of individuals and institutions whose internal coherence is held 
together by common concepts, practical aims, and distinctive claims for legitimacy—
began to emerge as a response to new practical dilemmas (human rights dilemmas) 
and as an attempt to systematize knowledge deemed useful to resolving them” (p. 
324) (parentheses added). 
 
On the other hand, Teitel´s article specifically identifies it as a genealogy of the field 
and locates it within an intellectual tradition “The notion of genealogy presented in this 
Article is structured along the lines of and situated within an intellectual history (M. 
Foucault)” (p.69) (parentheses added), yet her practice of genealogy can be 
questioned on various grounds. Although she recognizes that her use of temporal 
phases is just for heuristic purposes14 “to help understand the periodization of the 
various political and legal periods (...) there are overlaps between the three phases 
proposed here” (p. 69), since this practice goes against Foucault´s understanding of 
history, her teleological explanations are more problematic both from a conceptual 
history point of view and a Foucauldian approach: “Phase I of the genealogy, the 
postwar phase, began in 1945. Through its most recognized symbol, the Allied-run 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Closure,	  the	  Illusion	  of	  Reconciliation:	  Final	  Thoughts	  on	  Five	  Years	  as	  Co-­‐Editor-­‐in-­‐Chief.	  International	  
Journal	  of	  Transitional	  Justice,	  5,	  1-­‐10.	  14	  Temporal	  divisions	  in	  history	  	  are	  identified	  by	  Foucault´s	  	  as	  attempts	  to	  write	  a	  total	  history	  that	  is	  	  
”articulated	  into	  great	  units	  –	  stages	  or	  phases-­‐	  which	  contain	  within	  themselves	  their	  own	  principle	  of	  
cohesion”	  (p.	  11)	  	  and	  which	  he	  explicitly	  rejects	  FOUCAULT,	  M.	  1972.	  The	  Archeology	  of	  Knowledge,	  London,	  United	  Kingdom,	  Routledge	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Nuremberg Trials, this phase reflects the triumph of transitional justice within the 
scheme of international law” (p. 70) (highlight added). This ascription of intentionality 
reflects what Foucault (1972) would characterize as an attempt “to discover, already at 
work in each beginning, a principle of coherence and the outline of a future unity, to 
master time through a perpetually reversible relation between an origin and a term that 
are never given, but are always at work” (p. 24). This thesis understanding and 
practice of genealogy tries to avoid such “teleologies and totalizations” and fill in a 
perceived gap in transitional justice research. 
 
1.3. Main Conceptual Paradigms 
Truth Commissions are presently understood as one type of mechanisms within the 
broader area of transitional justice whose principal objective is to find out about the 
facts surrounding gross human rights violations and construct a narrative of what 
happened (Hayner, 2011). Both the process and the outcome of these inquiries are 
assumed to achieve several goals from reconciliation in divided societies to some form 
of accountability15 for massive crimes (Bronwyn, 2008, Daly, 2008, Dimitrijević, 2006, 
Eisikovits, 2011, Hayner, 2011, Hazan, 2006, Kritz, 1995). 
 
The search to end impunity in situations of limited political maneuverability partially16 
frames justice in terms of truth, “The pursuit of justice may be negotiable depending on 
the political circumstances, but the truth is not. Truth has assumed the position of an 
absolute value, one that cannot be renounced under any circumstances 
“(p.2)(Parlevliet, 1998). Nevertheless, other authors claim that this absoluteness of 
truth actually diverts the thirst for justice. In a study on the debates about truth and 
justice, J. Mendez asserts “A second pernicious position in this debate postulates that, 
even in the context of trying to settle accounts, truth is always preferable to justice” (p. 
267) (Mendez, 1997). 
  
Although some authors understand this search for truth as a key issue in the political 
transitions in Latin America during the 80´s since the majority of the crimes committed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  The	  UN	  Rules-­‐of-­‐Law	  Tools	  states	  that	  truth	  commissions	  ”offer	  some	  form	  of	  accounting	  for	  the	  past”	  (Introduction)	  OHCHR	  2006b.	  Rule	  of	  Law	  Tools	  for	  Post-­‐Conflict	  States:	  Truth	  Commissions.	  
HR/PUB/06/1.	  United	  Nations:	  Office	  High	  Commissioner	  Human	  Rights.	  16	  ”Partially”	  because	  other	  type	  of	  transitional	  justice	  mechanisms	  also	  are	  designed	  to	  advance	  justice	  (such	  as	  trials,	  vetting,	  reparations,	  etc.)	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by the state by their very nature imposed a veil of silence around society “the 
emphasis on truth is connected with the nature of (certain) human rights violations. 
Many violations are, as it were, to remain in the dark: torture and disappearances are 
examples of abuses that exist by the grace of secrecy and denial” (p.3) (Parlevliet, 
1998). Other authors claim that justice claims articulated in terms of dealing with the 
past and solving legal-institutional problems obscure other type of claims based on 
distributive justice and socio-economic challenges that lie at the base of most conflicts 
“on what grounds could one argue that such claims (reform of the socio-economic 
system) should not be considered transitional justice claims?” (p.359) (Parentheses 
added) (Paige, 2009). Yet, this path has also been criticized as when author L. 
Warldorf concludes in an article about transitional justice´s struggles to fulfil its 
promises of truth, justice and reconciliation, “Well-meaning efforts to have transitional 
justice tackle socio-economic wrongs will simply freight it with yet more unrealizable 
expectations” (p. 179) (Waldorf, 2012) 
  
Thus truth or rather the power of truth-telling is a contested claim, particularly when 
articulated as healing or reconciliatory (Daly, 2008, Hazan, 2006, Mendeloff, 2004, 
Weinstein, 2011), as concluded by Mendeloff (2004), “In the absence of compelling 
evidence, we should be sceptical of claims that formal truth-telling mechanisms are the 
best way to help or that such psychological healing in general is somehow 
necessary to build and maintain peace in post-conflict societies” (p. 365) (highlighted 
in original). 
 
Yet, the force of the healing argument is based on models over agency or rather the 
ability to have a voice as the high road not only to empower discriminated groups or 
victims, but also to help the whole society move towards a more peaceful future by 
means of a shared master narrative (Godwin Phelps, 2001, Urban Walker, 2007). In 
this regard, the construction of this narrative is considered an important process to 
allow the victim/families official acknowledgement of their suffering (Neier, 1990). This 
acknowledgment is thought as important or more than a retributive justice scheme, 
“What is the ultimate fulfillment of justice? Is it the punishment of perpetrators as we so 
quickly assume? Is it doing something and then putting the past behind? Or is it justice 
best understood as continually in the making?”( p.128) (Godwin Phelps, 2001) 
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Narrative theory basically states that a narrative is a basic human strategy for coming 
to terms with fundamental elements of our experience, such as time, process, and 
change (Project Narrative) 17 . By joining psycho-medical literature on emotional 
catharsis and arguments about the redemptive power and ethical function of narrative 
(Hayner, 1995) a case is built for the moral imperative of giving victims a platform for 
their version of events, or as moral philosopher M. Urban Walker asserts, “Rights to 
claim and tell the truth (…) aspire to a constitutive function in reengineering a moral 
and epistemic community and individual´s places and relations within it” (p.218) 
(Urban Walker, 2007) .  
 
Yet, for all the intuitive appeal of such arguments, in the field of literature studies and 
with regard to the influence of narratives in the development of empathy many a doubt 
has been voiced: “the most ethical act for literature is not the bridging of gaps through 
the creation of empathy, but the articulation and keeping alive of intractable ethical 
questions” (p.232) (highlight added) (Travis, 2010). Within this view, a master 
constructed narrative of painful events can, at best, be contented with keeping alive 
the memory of the past. 
 
In fact, with regard to truth-telling claims and in an apparently counter-intuitive move, 
some researchers have advocated for the value of silence as another form of 
communication that is also relevant within the context of violent conflict. Eastmond & 
Selimovic propose that the current discourse on truth-telling and politics of 
remembrance might not be what is needed in all circumstances, “The implicit 
assumption in the transitional justice discourse, therefore, is that silence is detrimental 
to social and individual healing in countries emerging from violent conflict, a view 
backed up by the psychomedical discourse on war trauma” p. 503 (Eastmond and 
Selimovic, 2012). Based on an field study done in post-war Bosnia Herzegovina and 
centered on the view that silence or speech as forms of communication are culturally 
sensitive, the authors propose that an assumed universal link between truth telling and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Website	  of	  the	  Project	  Narrative	  from	  the	  Ohio	  State	  University	  (accessed	  Nov.	  10,2012)	  http://projectnarrative.osu.edu/about/what-­‐is-­‐narrative-­‐theory	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reconciliation and/or accountability might not only be inexistent but obscures the need 
to go beyond standardized formulas in the reconstruction of societies. 
 
Truth, then, turns out to be a difficult concept not only because its healing power is not 
a given, but because establishing single, authoritative truth as to the “why certain 
events were allowed to happen” (OHCHR, 2006b), which is another cited claim, is 
itself controversial as well (Daly, 2008, Mendeloff, 2004). In conclusion we may say 
that many claims have been adjudicated to the truth-seeking function of truth 
commissions. However, the need to further elaborate on why or how justice and truth 
became inevitable demands for post-conflict states is still under-researched (Bell, 
2009, Subotic, 2012). In an article responding to the opening editorial in the first issue 
of the International Journal of Transitional Justice (1997) and trying to assess the 
nature of the present “field” of transitional justice, C. Bell argues: “The attempt to 
design transitional justice mechanisms to ‘implement’ essentially contested concepts 
either is futile or involves ignoring the contestation and viewing the concepts as 
reducible to a ‘toolkit’ approach involving a set of technical choices: what type of 
elections when, what type of justice sector reform when and what type of reconciliation 
mechanism when. This concedes an opportunity for academics and practitioners and 
for local and international actors to engage in a larger project of ongoing negotiation 
and compromise over what these concepts entail” (p.27) (Bell, 2009). 
 
This summary of the literature around the issues of transitional justice in general and 
truth commissions in particular, has attempted to contextualize the subject of inquiry of 
this thesis and to locate it within the current research corpus.  A description of the 
most relevant genealogical accounts of the field was provided with the intention of (1) 
to provide a background for the understandings of truth commissions, and (2) to 
differentiate the nature of the genealogical account that this thesis proposes. This 
account of historical processes 18  is appropriate when presenting the state of 
contemporary research in the area wherein apart from the mentioned articles by Paige 
(2009) and Teitel (2003), it seems like not many post-structuralist or foucauldian 
inspired studies have been conducted.  This type of studies can provide different 
understandings of the field by questioning taken for granted “truths”. Exposing the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Genealogical	  accounts	  situated	  within	  a	  Foucauldian	  	  framework	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process by which present insights have crystallized can help build up knowledge which 
may clarify the debated nature of many of the truth´s commissions claims. 
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
In order to explain how the present understanding of truth commissions became 
logically possible and assumed as a natural or normal condition 19 , this thesis 
theoretical framework will be based on a post-structuralist approach. This chapter will 
present first a clarification of what exactly counts here as a post-structuralist approach, 
its methodology, and how does this necessarily implies an emphasis on language. It 
will also explain how the process of articulation of a discourse has sometimes been 
likened to the process of framing as a way of constructing media discourses salient in 
the public agenda, hence a discussion of the differences and/or similarities between 
both concepts is presented as well. 
 
Building up on the previous discussions and on the fact that the thesis is partially built 
around a discourse analysis of an official UN policy document, a definition of the term 
discourse will follow. According to M. Foucault, discourses define what is “truth” at a 
particular moment while at the same time truth is primarily explained by 
power/knowledge interactions, hence an explanation of the terms truth (truth regimes) 
and power are also tied in to the previously mentioned concepts. It is also important to 
clarify that even though power is an important element in Foucault´s analyses due to 
scope limitations this thesis will not elaborate on the power interactions that inform UN 
understanding of truth commissions.  
 
To finalize, an examination of the concept of rights and specifically human rights will 
close the theoretical chapter. This last point is relevant since the UN understanding of 
truth commissions is articulated around a discourse on rights 
 
2.1. Post-structuralism and Language  
Although there are many disagreements as to what exactly counts as post-
structuralism (and how it differs from post-modernism, for example), and whether it is a 
legitimate approach to research, post-structuralism basically emphasizes: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  On	  his	  book	  about	  the	  genealogy	  of	  sovereignty,	  Bartelson	  explains	  his	  methodology	  as	  based	  on	  Foucault´s	  approach	  which	  “starts	  from	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  present,	  and	  explains	  the	  formation	  of	  this	  present	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  past”	  BARTELSON,	  J.	  1995.	  A	  Genealogy	  of	  Sovereignty,	  Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  (p.8)	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-­‐ The rejection of grand narratives to explain phenomena. Reality is seen as in 
continuous flux and not explainable by a single, deterministic truth (Sarup, 
1993) -­‐ A critique of the Cartesian understanding of the individual consciousness as 
in complete control of itself and capable of penetrating all the mysteries of 
nature -­‐ Language as the basis of consciousness and substantiating the power of 
discourse to shape perceptions of reality.  
Just as the study of nature may seem20 to facilitate a vantage point outside of 
ourselves for its comprehension, the study of social facts becomes artificial but from 
within them. While not proposing that language predates reality, it is language that 
helps us make sense of it. Our understanding of phenomena is mediated by it. If this is 
so with regard to so-called hard, natural facts, is this not even more accurate of 
human-made constructs (such as truth or the rule of law)? As expressed by the 
following post-structuralist authors:  
“To post-structuralism, language is ontologically significant: it is only through the 
construction in language that “things” – objects, subjects, states, living beings, and 
material structures- are given meaning and endowed with a particular identity” 
(Hansen, 2006, p.18) 
“In the beginning was the word; discourse is autonomous and has primacy, but is not 
itself foundational; its autonomy and primacy does not reside in any magical or 
metaphysical ability to produce physical reality, but in its ability to organize knowledge 
systematically, so that some things become intelligible, and others not” (Emphasis 
added) (p.70)(Bartelson, 1995) 
 
Apart from being vital to our perception of the world -hence, critical to research about 
it- language is inherently social in that it necessarily implies a collective dimension. 
Even more, language is political. By this we mean that language is a site of conflict21: 
some discourses are promoted or preferred and gain ascendancy while others are 
excluded. It is important to emphasize this process of exclusion because those 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Here	  a	  careful	  wording	  is	  used	  because	  a	  more	  far-­‐reaching	  view	  within	  post-­‐structuralism	  claims	  that	  even	  the	  study	  of	  natural	  facts	  is	  situated	  within	  language.	  21	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  political	  is	  only	  conflict.	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discourses that gain ascendancy end up positioning themselves as the logical or 
natural ones, so deeply embedded in social reality as to appear as incontestable truths 
(e.g. gender discourse). Dissenting discourses that are either silenced or ignored, can 
provide us with clues as to what were the discursive paths not taken in the 
understanding of an object, concept or event. 
 
Powerfully loaded concepts like liberty or state, not only have a wide-ranging history 
back them, but have gone through subtle (and sometimes not so subtle) changes, and 
have come to mean different things in different ages, to different peoples. For 
example, reflecting on the re-appearance in the political arena under a positive light of 
the concepts of “empire” and “imperialism”, Neumann & Jordheim (2011) state  
“concepts come with specific historical and social baggage. They are defined by their 
meanings and uses and become powerful in battle with other concepts” (p.153). 
Politics is generated in language, therefore the analysis of a discourse could well be 
the appropriate starting point for the study of particular political arrangements, as well 
as for the disclosing of those alternatives that were/are excluded, purposefully or not, 
from the arena.  
 
Hence, a post-structuralist approach does not imply a focus on language per se, but 
rather a focus on the nature of the relationship between discourse and its practices 
regardless of whether they are truth commissions, development or failed states. Within 
the International Relations field, post-structuralist research has mostly been focused 
on: (1) power and knowledge interactions, (2) identity and sovereignty (3) use of 
textual strategies (Devetak, 2009, Hansen, 2006) . Yet, it is important to stress that 
although the analysis of discourse has been widely used to unveil power/knowledge 
interactions and a lot of focus has been given to this dynamic, this does not mean that 
knowledge is reducible to power or vice versa.  
  
2.2. Post-structuralism and Methodology 
Post-structuralist inquiry has been criticized for not being methodologically   robust, for 
lacking a scientific basis and for an “anything goes” type of attitude. This censure 
points more towards a lack of understanding of it than towards a real limitation in the 
approach.  According to Hansen (2006), “for post-structuralism what constitutes 
proper knowledge is not a theory´s ability to uncover causal truths (…) Causal 
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epistemology cannot establish its privilege with reference to any objective truth, as its 
own criterion for truth is enshrined within a historically situated discourse of knowledge 
and not in a trans-historical, trans-discursive universal objectivity” (p.10) (Emphasis 
added)  
 
This dismissal of a rigid causal epistemology and its scientism22 leads to the charge of 
methodological anarchy and even relativism. While it´s true that there are not clear-cut 
recipes as to how to accomplish post-structuralist research and some authors can 
appear on the surface as inscrutable as a Sumerian text (e.g. Derrida) no one can 
reproach M. Foucault, for example, of not doing extensive, meticulous and profoundly 
creative investigations. A focus on language does not disqualify the need for methods 
or imply that the results are relative due to their contingency. It basically proposes a 
different kind of research agenda wherein the ideational aspects are not seen as 
opposed, independent or predating the material ones, but as “mutually constitutive and 
discursively linked” (p. 28) (Hansen, 2006). This interaction between ideational and 
material aspects can be studied through the analysis of the institutional practices, 
because discourse influences how ideas are put into practice. 
 
On the other hand, the absence of precise methodological principles for conducting 
research is not a shortcoming, but rather a strength, Foucault himself expressed it: 
“What I must do is to take caution to be explicit about what I´m doing without trying to 
dictate what is to be done” (Foucault 198023 ) (Emphasis mine). By leaving the 
methodological door open, the challenge is to find creative ways to systematically 
conduct careful analytical work without being limited by rigid systems. Again, it is 
important to stress that this is not a proposal for anarchy but to see methodology as a 
way to communicate choices and strategies that all research must make (Hansen, 
2006). 
 
As for the charge of relativism and although some post-modern scholars may declare 
its belief in an extreme form of discursiveness wherein nothing exists outside of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  The	  theory	  that	  investigational	  methods	  used	  in	  the	  natural	  sciences	  should	  be	  applied	  in	  all	  fields	  of	  inquiry	  (The	  American	  Heritage	  Dictionary	  of	  the	  English	  Language,	  1980)	  23	  Cited	  in	  GRAHAM,	  L.	  2005.	  Discourse	  Analysis	  and	  the	  Critical	  Use	  of	  Foucault.	  Australian	  Association	  
for	  Research	  in	  Education	  -­‐	  Annual	  Conference.	  Sydney,	  Australia:	  Queensland	  University	  of	  Technology.	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language, the analysis attempted in this thesis is more interested in questioning taken 
for granted truths not with the aim to relativize them – that is to make them 
meaningless - but in order to illustrate that an order of things may not need to be as it 
is presently understood. This, of course, can imply a call for practice24, yet this practice 
is not to be seen as a proposal for a new and truer way of doing (since that would go 
against the original idea that there is not a Truth, but rather contingent, historically 
situated truths), but instead “to listen to the oppressed rather than act as the standard-
bearer of their liberation (…) offering specific historical analysis that are useful for their 
struggle”(p.6) (May, 1993). 
 
2.3. Alternative Ways of Articulating Discourses: Framing? 
Apart from post-structuralists and Foucauldians other disciplines have also reflected 
on the way that a discourse is articulated. Within sociology and the communication 
fields, discourse is also a crucial element and the concept of “framing” has been 
developed to understand the way a discourse is built up.  
 
The use of framing as a concept indicating how a particular discourse is constructed 
and made salient in the public agenda has been studied extensively from different 
angles. Within the sociology field, E. Goffman proposed in 1974 the term “frame” to 
“describe a schemata of interpretation used by individuals to attach meaning to events 
and occurrences” (Sandberg, 2006). This notion was taken up and further elaborated 
by Snow & Benford (2000) while studying collective social movements. In their work, 
they introduce the concept of “master frames” which is defined as  “Cognitive 
structures limiting framing activity because they have a constructed language and 
repertoire of action that movements must relate to whether they want it or not” 25. This 
definition of master frames is to be linked with that of ideology26, yet other scholars 
(Oliver & Johnston, Jasper, Steinberg) have criticized this approach on the grounds 
that ideology is not only conceptually different from framing, but that ideology carries 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  This	  would	  be	  an	  answer	  to	  those	  critics	  of	  post-­‐structuralism	  or	  of	  Foucault	  that	  claim	  that	  this	  type	  of	  approach	  leads	  to	  no	  political	  engagement	  or	  a	  kind	  of	  passivity	  in	  the	  face	  of	  power.	  25	  SANDBERG,	  S.	  2006.	  Fighting	  Neo-­‐liberalism	  with	  Neo-­‐liberal	  Discourse:	  ATTAC	  Norway,	  Foucault	  and	  Collective	  Action	  Framing1.	  Social	  Movement	  Studies,	  5,	  209-­‐227.	  26	  From	  a	  framing	  perspective	  “ideologies	  constitute	  cultural	  resources	  that	  can	  be	  tapped	  and	  exploited	  for	  
the	  purpose	  of	  constructing	  collective	  action	  frames,	  and	  thus	  function	  simultaneously	  to	  facilitate	  and	  
constrain	  framing	  processes”	  BENFORD,	  R.	  D.	  &	  SNOW,	  D.	  A.	  2000.	  Framing	  Processes	  and	  Social	  Movements:	  An	  Overview	  and	  Assessment.	  Annual	  Review	  of	  Sociology,	  26,	  611-­‐639. 
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an evaluative and political clout that is either left out of much of framing theorizing or 
watered down 27: “the concept of frame points to the cognitive process wherein people 
bring to bear background knowledge to interpret an event or circumstance and to 
locate it in a larger system of meaning (…) Applied to social movement studies, 
framing processes mostly refer to the intentional activity of movement entrepreneurs at 
the organizational level” (Oliver and Johnston, 2000). In general terms, it can be said 
that most explanations of framing are very focused on agency and lack any reference 
to structural constraints in language, which is exactly what more critical approaches 
derived from Marxist studies or within the Foucauldian tradition propose.  
 
Within the communications and public relations field, a slightly different angle of the 
framing issue was being studied. Originally based on studies of public opinion, political 
campaigns and mass media, the “agenda setting” theory came to the foreground in 
1970´s. It was McCombs & Shaw, after studying the 1968 presidential campaign in 
USA, that proposed that “while the mass media may have little influence on the 
direction or intensity of attitudes, it is hypothesized that the mass media set the 
agenda for each political campaign, influencing the salience of attitudes toward the 
political issues” (McCombs and Shaw, 1972) (cursive in the original). 
 
This agenda setting capability of the mass media meant that while unable to persuade 
the public (and contrary to common sense knowledge), the media was, though, quite 
successful at influencing people on what to think about. The agenda-setting theory 
opened up a fruitful and long line of research within the communications field that 
recently has also included framing. McCombs, Shaw & Weaver have proposed to 
include framing theory as a sort of second-level agenda setting suggesting that while 
the first level tell us “what to think about”, the second-level would tells us “how to think 
about”. While this shift was meant to further strengthen the agenda setting theory, the 
move has been criticized from different quarters for allegedly trying two conjoin two 
different theoretical constructs (Scheufele, 2000). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  N.	  Fairclough	  further	  states	  that	  there	  are	  two	  different	  definitions	  of	  ideology:	  “The	  critical	  view	  of	  
ideology,	  seeing	  it	  as	  modality	  of	  power,	  contrasts	  with	  various	  descriptive	  views	  of	  ideology	  as	  positions,	  
attitudes,	  beliefs,	  perspectives,	  etc.	  without	  reference	  to	  relations	  of	  power	  of	  domination	  between	  such	  
groups”	  FAIRCLOUGH,	  N.	  2003.	  Analysing	  Discourse:	  Textual	  Analysis	  for	  Social	  Research,	  London,	  Routledge.	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 . 
As mentioned before, framing theory research has not focused either on the structural 
or the less rational constraints of language while discourse analysis (as practiced by 
Laclau/Mouffee or within the Foucauldian tradition) and to a certain extent Critical 
Discourse analysis (N.Fairclough) has extensively worked on those subjects. 
Therefore for the purposes of this thesis, while acknowledging the potentially 
interesting aspect of using framing theory in the analysis of UN discourse on truth 
commissions, we will be referring to the articulation of discourses as a process that 
constitutes them by first placing the issues on the agenda, and thus shaping the way 
we think about it. Furthermore it shapes not only thought but also action through 
practice (McNeill, 2007). 
 
However this process does not mean that the articulation of a discourse has a 
beginning, middle and an end point. Although discourses are relatively stable over 
time, they are not static and counter-discourses will always try to compete in the public 
consciousness with more or less success, “because a discourse maintains a degree of 
regularity in social relations, it produces preconditions for action (…) but discourse 
cannot determine action completely. There will always be more than one possible 
outcome. Discourse analysis aims at specifying the bandwidth of possible outcomes” 
(p.62)(Neumann, 2009) 
 
2.4. Main Concepts 
Summarizing in a few paragraphs concepts that have taken authors’ whole chapters or 
even books to explain seems a daunting, if not an unpractical, task. Yet, for the 
purposes of designing an analytical strategy for this thesis we need to strip them down 
to their essentials, so to speak. Out of these essentials, we also need to capture those 
elements that are most useful for this particular analysis and this particular subject  
(truth commissions). These decisions might not make justice to the complexity and 
fruitfulness of Foucault´s vocabulary; the hope is that the spirit permeating the analysis 
does so. 
 
2.4.1. Discourse 
The analysis of discourse is one of methods used within the post-structuralist tradition 
to highlight the construction of social facts. Yet the understanding of discourse itself is 
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not a settled issue. Based on the work done by M. Foucault, discourse28 is defined 
here as:  “Not purely a linguistic concept. It is about language and practice (…) It 
defines and produces the objects of our knowledge. It governs the way a topic can be 
meaningfully talked and reasoned about. It also influences how ideas are put into 
practice (…) Meaning and meaningful practice are thus constructed under discourse 
(Hall, 2001) ”. Thus, for example, if we would like to question the discourse on 
punishment (as for example Foucault did), we would have to study not just the 
different discursive practices such as documents, policies, books, laws, and so on; but 
also the non-discursive practices, that is the specific practices that also constitute the 
penal system field such as prisons, reformatories, justice courts, cells, etc. In short, a 
discourse consists of both discursive and non-discursive practices. 
 
However, the question still remains as to what exactly within language interacts with 
non-discursive practices to produce discourse? Foucault wrote that a discourse is a 
regular grouping of statements, and they are defined “not as a unit of a linguistic type 
(…) but an enunciative function” (p.119) (Foucault, 1972). He then goes on to explain 
that statements are neither grammatical sentences, nor logical propositions. The 
closest referent would be the English analysts29 “speech act” which he explains as an 
act of formulation30. Yet while speech acts theorists are mostly interested in how the 
hearer understands a formulation of everyday acts - as in the example “Please shut 
the door” - the keynote to Foucault´s statement is that they originate from authoritative 
sources which “allow privileged speakers to speak with authority (…) and assert what 
it is a serious truth claim” (p. 48) (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982) . Thus statements are 
enunciations that by nature of their source can constitute truth objects and herein rests 
the so-called productive nature of discourse. Nevertheless it must be remembered, 
that this productivity of discourse lies as much as in the authoritativeness of the source 
as in the interaction between discursive and non-discursive practices.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Discourse	  is	  also	  referred	  to	  as	  Discursive	  Practice	  and	  both	  terms	  have	  been	  used	  interchangeably	  29	  Here	  Foucault	  is	  referring	  to	  J.L.	  Austin	  (”How	  to	  do	  things	  with	  words”)	  and	  John	  	  Searle	  who	  developed	  the	  concept	  of	  speech	  acts	  based	  on	  the	  work	  of	  Austin	  and	  L.	  Wittgenstein	  30	  “Speech	  act	  is	  what	  ocurred	  by	  the	  very	  fact	  that	  a	  statement	  was	  made	  –	  and	  precisely	  this	  statement	  (and	  
no	  other)	  in	  specific	  circumstances”	  (p.93)FOUCAULT,	  M.	  1972.	  The	  Archeology	  of	  Knowledge,	  London,	  United	  Kingdom,	  Routledge	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Discourses not only encompass a set of statements, since it includes non-discursive 
practices, but the result is also much more than the sum of its elements. A discourse 
becomes a sort of constellation that with the force of its pull constantly attracts to itself 
related ideas. Like Russian babushka dolls, one discourse is nested into the other until 
you reach the overarching discourse, so to speak, that which in Foucauldian terms is 
called discursive formation: “Whenever these discursive events refer to the same 
object … share the same style …  and support a strategy … a common institutional, 
political or administrative drift or pattern … then they are said by Foucault to belong to 
the same discursive formation” (Hall, 2001).  Understanding how these discursive 
formations develop, what are the rules of their existence becomes the task to be 
carried out by the “archaeologist”31. While this thesis is only focused on discourse and 
its genealogy, it is necessary to mention that Foucault´s “archaeologies” aimed at 
determining the rules of existence of these discursive formations “their conditions of 
existence and institutionalization” (p.55) (Kaarhus, 1999). 
 
Setting aside Foucault´s complex terminology it can be argued that his main objective 
when analyzing discourse was to provide “an alternative reading of history that yields 
new insights”, the questioning of obvious truths (p.34)(Gutting, 2003).  
  
2.4.3. Truth 
Discursive formations lead us to the issue of truth, which has been broadly discussed 
by “foucauldians” and wherein truth is understood as historically situated and mostly 
defined by knowledge-power interactions32. Foucault states that: Truth isn't outside 
power, or lacking in power (…) truth isn't the reward of free spirits, the child of 
protracted solitude, nor the privilege of those who have succeeded in liberating 
themselves. Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms 
of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power” Each society has its régime of 
truth, its 'general polities' of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and 
makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to 
distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Foucault´s	  reference	  to	  himself	  when	  doing	  this	  type	  of	  research	  32	  Here	  it	  is	  convenient	  to	  stress	  that	  Foucault	  didn´t	  discuss	  the	  ”Truth	  of	  knowledge	  in	  the	  absolute	  sense	  –	  a	  Truth	  which	  remained	  so	  whatever	  the	  period,	  setting,	  context	  –	  but	  of	  a	  discursive	  formation	  sustaining	  a	  regime	  of	  truth”	  HALL,	  S.	  2001.	  Foucault:	  Power,	  Knowledge	  and	  Discourse.	  In:	  WETHERELL,	  M.,	  TAYLOR,	  S.	  &	  YATES,	  S.	  (eds.)	  Discourse	  Theory	  and	  Practice:	  A	  Reader.	  London:	  Sage	  Publications.	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techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of 
those who are charged with saying what counts as true” 33.  
 
If we accept that truth is deeply conditioned, how would a search for the “truth” of a 
historical event look like? What circumstances call for the need to investigate the 
overall causes and consequences of contested events such as it is proposed in truth 
commissions? Foucault´s answer when describing traditional historical analysis would 
be that the underlying thought is the need to assert agency, “the sovereignty of the 
subject” (Foucault, 1972). Against this type of traditional historical analysis he would 
propose the methods of archaeology and genealogy “to question teleology and 
totalizations” (idem, p. 17). 
 
2.4.4. Power 
In the earlier paragraphs on post-structuralism and language, it was mentioned that 
although power and knowledge interactions have been important within post-
structuralism research agenda, they are not reducible to each other. These two 
concepts are strongly associated, but both power and knowledge are also much more. 
Foucault´s interpretation of power is not the common reading that has it as the ability 
to make others do what they would normally not do if given the option (as in a powerful 
regime oppressing the masses). In fact he asserts at one point that power does exist, 
“only individual relations of power and control” (Foucault on Gutting 2003:35). Yet, 
power is understood as something positive in the sense of being productive, as 
Kendall & Wickham explain about Foucault´s power interpretation “we should think of 
power not as an attribute (and ask what is it?), but as an exercise (and ask, how does 
it work?). In addition, forces have a capacity for resistance, such that power is only 
exercised in relation to resistance” (p. 50) (Kendall and Wickham, 1999).  
 
This conception of power has attracted a lot criticism since it seems to dilute its force 
and leaves open the question as to who is struggling against whom34. Agency seems 
to disappear and we are only left with a diffuse understanding with no clear anchoring 
in materiality. However according to other reviewers, these criticisms of Foucault´s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Foucault	  on	  ”Truth	  and	  Power”,	  an	  interview	  by	  Alessandro	  Fontana	  and	  Pasquale	  Pasquino	  (1976)	  34	  Which	  has	  led	  critics	  like	  J.	  Habermas	  to	  describe	  Foucault	  as	  a	  ”neo-­‐conservative”	  GUTTING,	  G.	  2003.	  
The	  Cambridge	  Companion	  to	  Foucault,	  Cambridge,	  UK,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	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power concept are unjustified. Even if his conception of power is less straightforward 
that Marxists accounts, the notion of resistance gives a “space for possibility and 
freedom in any context”(Gutting, 2003). On the other hand, his understanding is based 
on a philosophical bent towards historical nominalism that essentially rejects 
universalisms: “What Foucault calls his nominalism is a form of methodological 
individualism. It treats such abstractions as man and power as reducible for the 
purposes of explanation to the individuals that comprise them”(idem, p. 40) 
(emphasis added). Indeed Foucault´s problematization of power underlines all of his 
genealogies. His approach to it is double-pronged: power interacting with knowledge 
to uphold truth and the normalization of power. Contrary to analyses focused on top-
down power interactions, Foucault is interested in how power is institutionalized and 
normalized at the bottom level. 
 
For scope reasons the analytical work undertaken here does not include power 
interactions, yet it is important to describe and keep his understanding of power in the 
background as it animates the articulation of discourse. Let´s bear in mind that we will 
be analysing a discourse coming from an authoritative source, the UN. 
 
2.4.5. Rights   
As mentioned earlier, the UN discourse on truth commissions is articulated around 
rights, specifically the right to know (also called the right to truth) and the right to 
justice. Yet, although it may seem that human rights are part of our natural inheritance 
as human beings, this is hardly the case. 
 
Rights discussion surrounds us everywhere and most people seem to be aware of the 
rights they are entitled to particularly with regard to the most common ones, such as 
the right to life, to freedom of speech and to property. Yet, exploring the discourse on 
rights is no such an easy effort and peering into their constitution and history 
immediately shows that this is a deeply controversial area. Within the philosophy field 
a dissection of the concept of right reveals a complex internal structure compounded 
of form and function. While the form aims at clarifying the basic elements of a right 
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(privilege, claim, power and immunity) as first stated by W. Hohfeld35, its functions 
seeks to question what rights do for those who hold them (Wenar, 2011). But what are 
the justifications for the existence of rights? In this regard it can be said that the main 
debates are essentially centred around two lines of thought: an instrumentalist 
approach which renders rights necessary “for producing an optimal distribution of 
interest across some group”, and status theories which, along Kantian lines, claim that 
“human beings have inherent attributes that make it fitting to ascribe certain rights to 
them” (Wenar, 2011). Of course both approaches have its strengths and weaknesses 
and the discussion on the need and function of rights will probably not be settled in the 
near future.   
 
The purpose of this brief exposition is to indicate how concepts such as “rights” can 
easily be taken for granted in their daily usage, and thus obscure the fact that there 
are no clear-cut agreements as to what they are. Any approach to their understanding 
whether from a legalist, economic, political or anthropological point of view will 
necessarily colour its definition.  
 
The understanding of truth commissions seems to be the result of a legalist approach 
to politics that is facilitated by a human rights discourse articulated around the notions 
of the right to know/truth and the right to justice. While these two purported rights are 
desirable ethical claims, it could be asserted that they are not yet legalized 
entitlements as such36. Some legal authors (Naqvi, 2006) have claimed that their 
legality could be grounded in customary law since these rights have been discussed, 
advocated and applied since at least the 80´s, by the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, the European Court of Human Rights and the African Commission on Human´s 
and People´s Rights, among other institutions. Yet, she also adds that the repeated 
inference of a right to information (about the circumstances of serious human rights 
violations) as a way to vindicate other codified rights may not fulfill the requirements of 
customary law. Furthermore, we might be dealing with “a narrative device used by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  American	  Legal	  Theorist	  (1879-­‐1918).	  More	  about	  his	  theory	  in:	  WENAR,	  L.	  2011.	  Rights.	  In:	  ZALTA,	  E.	  N.	  (ed.)	  The	  Stanford	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Philosophy.	  36	  See	  	  Amartya	  Sen	  for	  a	  discussion	  on	  legalized	  and	  not	  legalized	  but	  ethical	  claims	  	  SEN,	  A.	  2004.	  Elements	  of	  a	  Theory	  of	  Human	  Rights.	  Philosophy	  &	  Public	  Affairs,	  32,	  315-­‐356.	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courts and human rights bodies to merely strengthen and give detail to those rights 
codified in the conventions? (idem p.258). 
 
Within the UN system, a study dedicated exclusively to the right to truth was carried 
out in 2006 (OHCHR, 2006a). This study documented the extensive practice of the 
right to the truth as indicated by the existence of truth commissions, diverse 
international court rulings and in the jurisprudence of various intergovernmental bodies 
and courts at international, regional and national levels. It also concludes by saying 
that “The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights recommends that they 
continue to examine the content and scope of the right to the truth. Further studies 
could explore in depth the societal and individual dimension of this right” (OHCHR 
2006:15 para.62). As of December 2012, another study on the right to truth was 
carried out but focused on programs and other measures for witness protection 
concerning trials for gross human rights violations (OHCHR, 2010). 
 
The fact that the legal status of certain rights is discussed and/or challenged points to 
urgent need of further conceptual clarification. This was one of the worries expressed 
by A. Sen when discussing the whole notion of human rights and particularly the 
criticism directed towards the socio-economic rights: “the conceptual doubts must also 
be satisfactorily addressed, if the idea of human rights is to command reasoned loyalty 
and to establish a secure intellectual standing” (p.317)(Sen, 2004).  
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3. METHODOLOGY 
 “Rationalists can not claim to be the sole keepers of the 
methodological grail” (Hansen, 2006) 
 
The decision to analyse the UN discourse on truth commissions through a 
genealogical approach takes us to the question of the methodology to be used to 
achieve this. As mentioned in the introduction, a genealogical approach to discourse is 
a way of conducting a “history of the present”. Inspired by Nietzsche ´s work in 
“Genealogy of Morals” Foucault´s argues against traditional historical analyses that 
“search for an original foundation that would make rationality the telos of mankind” 
(p.14)(Foucault, 1972). Instead a proposal for the decentring of the subject - “an 
analysis purged of all anthropologism”- is proposed. This can be achieved by means of 
looking for discontinuities, difference, rupture and transformations “(the discontinuous 
as a working concept) which is no longer the negative of a historical reading (its 
underside, its failure, the limit of its power) but the positive element that determines its 
object and validates its analysis” (idem p.10). 
 
Starting from a situation that is found difficult, taken for granted or “intolerable” an 
analysis of its history based on the above-mentioned criteria is conducted. In 
Foucault´s case this genealogical analysis was very useful not only to highlight the 
quite often contingent nature of the taken for granted issue, but to focus on its power 
interactions. For the purposes of this thesis and due to scope limitations, this power 
element of the analysis will not be undertaken. Yet, it must be mentioned and retained 
in the background, as it generally will cast a shadow in genealogical analyses.  
 
A genealogy of the UN discourse on truth commissions will then imply an analysis of 
the diverse historical circumstances that coalesce in its present definition (by focusing 
in Foucault´s “discontinuities, ruptures and transformations”), and secondly will focus 
on the definition itself (Rule of Law Tool document) to highlight its underlying 
oppositions and themes. The analysis of document is relevant because of the 
constitutive nature of the interactions between discursive and non-discursive practices 
that was explained in the section on concepts. However, it is important to stress that 
the interaction between discursive and non-discursive practices does not suggest a 
causal link (document àtruth commission practice), but in accordance with post-
	   46	  
structuralism´ epistemological claim, the inseparability of their interactions (Hansen, 
2006).  
 
In our specific case, the UN policy on truth commission37 is a discursive practice that 
illustrates its official stance on the issue and also a template that is embodied in 
specific truth commissions around the world (non-discursive practices), as the UN 
Secretary General explains to the General Assembly, “The past year (2011) has seen 
the establishment or the functioning of truth-seeking processes in a number of 
countries, including Brazil, Cote d´Ívoire and Guinea. The truth, justice and 
reconciliation commissions in Solomon Islands and Togo both submitted final reports 
in 2012” (Secretary General, 2012) (parentheses added). 
 
In keeping with the above-presented research criteria, a methodological outline 
follows.  
 
3.1. Research Design 
Case Study:  Case studies generally entail the intensive and detailed analysis of a 
single case (Bryman, 2008). This thesis proposes to use the case of the UN discourse 
on truth commissions to illuminate its historical situation. Thus, it will focus on the 
multiple premises under which truth commissions are understood and what are the 
consequences of this particular articulation. The chapter on the genealogical 
examination presents this historical context and it will be followed by the analysis of 
the official UN document that supports the truth commission practice. 
 
3.2. Methods 
3.2.1. Discourse analysis: There are no agreed upon methods for conducting 
discourse analysis within the post-structuralist tradition. Yet in this thesis, we will 
undertake an eclectic synthesis of the methodology outlined by J. Carabine and L. 
Hansen as discourse analysis/genealogy (Carabine, 2001, Hansen, 2006). This is 
because their explanations are systematic, easier to operationalize; and also because 
they deal with the subject of how discursive practices interact with policy, which is of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  This	  official	  policy	  is	  the	  Rule	  of	  Law	  Tools	  for	  Post-­‐conflict	  States	  (OHCHR	  2006b.	  Rule	  of	  Law	  Tools	  for	  Post-­‐Conflict	  States:	  Truth	  Commissions.	  HR/PUB/06/1.	  United	  Nations:	  Office	  High	  Commissioner	  Human	  Rights.)	  
	   47	  
particular interest in this thesis. The analysis procedure will be discussed in more 
detail further on. 
 
3.2.2. Sampling: Non-random purposive sample  
Since the purpose of a genealogical analysis is not to generate a conclusion that can 
be generalized to a hypothetical population, the sampling issue loses part of its 
methodological centrality. In keeping with a “qualitative” type of research (as opposed 
to analyses based on quantitative data), in this thesis the collection of relevant data is 
non-random and purposively serves the analysis “this type of sampling is essentially to 
do with the selection of units (which may be people, organizations, documents, 
departments, etc.), with direct reference to the research questions being asked ” (p. 
375) (Bryman, 2008) However, we still have to decide which texts38 to collect? How to 
define the criteria for the sampling method? 
 
Discourses are never isolated or exist in a vacuum, they generally interact with each 
other in regular ways to create what Foucault has termed discursive formation (see 
theoretical chapter). In order to explore these formations, this thesis focuses on 
documents produced by two different, but highly interrelated agencies within the UN: 
the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Rule of Law unit. 
 
However, it is important to underline that, hypothetically, the context of a discourse 
could include texts from other sources. Researchers, lawyers, non-governmental 
organizations (NGO´s), and so on, also inform the documents produced by the UN. In 
many cases, some individual’s work is produced simultaneously for the UN and an 
NGO39 and in a way, the picture is aptly described thus, “Diverse discourses are 
intimately engaged with each other and together form the giant milling mass of overall 
societal discourse (…)CDA (critical discourse analysis) aims to disentangle the giant 
milling mass of discourse, to chart what is said and can be said in a given society at a 
given time” (p.36) (Jager and Maier, 2009). It is beyond the reach of this thesis to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Discourse analysis generally deals with text. Although you could potentially also include photos, works of art 
and/other artifacts in the study of discourse, this thesis is limited to textual sources. 39	  For	  example,	  we	  can	  mention	  Priscilla	  Hayner	  who	  has	  been	  Program	  Director	  (2002-­‐	  )	  of	  the	  “International	  Center	  for	  Transitional	  Justice”	  –	  one	  of	  the	  most	  influential	  NGO´s	  in	  the	  field-­‐	  and	  has	  also	  been	  the	  “consultant	  who	  had	  the	  primary	  responsibility	  for	  developing	  the	  tool	  (e.g.	  Rule	  of	  Law	  Tool)”	  OHCHR	  2006b.	  Rule	  of	  Law	  Tools	  for	  Post-­‐Conflict	  States:	  Truth	  Commissions.	  HR/PUB/06/1.	  United	  Nations:	  Office	  High	  Commissioner	  Human	  Rights.	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“disentangle the mass of overall societal discourse” on truth commissions, thus the 
focus will be only on official UN documents.  
 
Within the UN system, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights was 
created in 1993 as part of the Secretariat (headed by the Secretary General and which 
services the other principal UN organs and administers the programs and policies laid 
down by them40) and as the leading entity on human rights: “OHCHR’s work is focused 
on three broad areas: human rights standard-setting, human rights monitoring and 
supporting human rights implementation at the country level. More specifically, the 
Office provides support to the human rights treaty bodies and mechanisms, deploys 
staff to various country situations and promotes global and national level advocacy for 
adherence to human rights norms and standard” OHCHR Management Plan 2012-
201341. 
 
This office (from now on OHCHR) also provides substantive and organizational 
support to other human rights mechanisms within the UN such as the Human Rights 
Council, an inter-governmental body within the UN system made up of 47 states, 
which are elected by the General Assembly. The Human Rights Council was created 
in 2006 and replaced the former UN Commission on Human Rights. Succinctly we can 
say that its work consists of the following procedures and mechanisms: Universal 
Periodic Review, Advisory Committee, Complain and Special Procedures42. 
 
As for the Rule of Law, The Rule of Law Coordination and Resource Group is chaired 
by a Deputy Secretary-General and supported by the Rule of Law Unit of the 
Executive Office of the Secretary-General43. This unit was created in 2006 with the 
“responsibility for the overall coordination, quality and coherence of the rule of law 
within the UN system” (p.17)(Secretary General, 2012). The group includes 
representatives from the leading UN entities including the OHCHR.44 This, in principle, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Accessed	  Nov.	  2nd,	  2012	  http://www.un.org/en/mainbodies/secretariat/	  41	  Accessed	  Nov.	  2nd,	  2012	  http://www2.ohchr.org/english/ohchrreport2011/web_version/ohchr_mp_2012_2013_web_en/index.html#/home	  42	  For	  more	  on	  the	  work	  of	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Council:	  http://www2.ohchr.org/english/	  43	  Accessed	  Nov.	  3rd,	  2012	  http://www.unrol.org/article.aspx?article_id=47	  44	  The	  other	  UN	  entities	  included	  in	  the	  group	  are:	  Dept.	  of	  Political	  Affairs,	  Dept.	  Peacekeeping	  Operations,	  Office	  of	  Legal	  Affairs,	  Unicef,	  UN-­‐Women,	  UNDP	  and	  UNODC.	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ensures quick and coherent efforts between the different agencies and “support for the 
rule of law through the promotion of a common understanding of challenges and 
approaches among field-based staff, and between headquarters and the field” (Idem p. 
18). Because the UN discourse on truth commissions is highly articulated in legalist 
terms, it seems adequate to use documents from both the already named UN entities 
(OHCHR and Rule of Law) in the analysis. 
 
3.3.3. Documents 
The principal document to be analyzed is one of the official UN sanctioned tool for 
dealing with post-conflict states (Rule of Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Truth 
Commissions / UN – 2006)45. However, this text is build up on previous work, hence 
the following sources will also be included as they are part of the discursive context, 
and because they are also official UN documents46:  -­‐ Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights 
through Action to Combat Impunity (E/CN4/2005/102 and Add.1) Report of the 
independent expert, Dianne Orentlicher -­‐ Independent Study on Best Practices, including recommendations, to assist 
States in strengthening their domestic capacity to combat all aspects of 
impunity- Dianne Orentlicher (E/CN4/2004/88) -­‐ Question of Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations (Civil and 
Political)- Louis Joinet UN – 1997 (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.1 -­‐ The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies – 
Report of the Secretary General Kofi Annan (S/2004/616) -­‐ Uniting our Strengths: Enhancing United Nations Support for the Rule of Law- 
Report of the Secretary General Kofi Annan (A/61/636-S/2006/980) 
 
3.4. Data Analysis Procedure 
In order to conduct a Foucauldian discourse analysis it´s difficult to isolate a precise 
process because Foucault rejected being methodologically pigeonholed, “the need to 
interpret Foucault sits ill with his desire to escape general interpretative 
categories”(Gutting, 2003) . However, he did provide some clues as to his general 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  (HR/PUB/06/1).	  The	  other	  tools	  refer	  to:	  Prosecution	  Initiatives,	  Vetting,	  Maximizing	  the	  Legacy	  of	  Hybrid	  Courts,	  Reparations	  Programs,	  Amnesties,	  National	  Consultations	  on	  Transitional	  Justice,	  Mapping	  the	  Justice	  Sector	  and	  Monitoring	  Legal	  Systems.	  46	  This	  selection	  will	  ensure	  that	  we	  cover	  the	  criteria	  of	  representativeness	  and	  validity	  of	  the	  sampling.	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orientation in “The Archeology of Knowledge” (1972) and they have become the 
foundation of much later work done by succeeding waves of Foucault-inspired authors 
who have followed and/or re-adapted these initial clarifications according to their 
objects of study or particular research agendas (Bartelson, 1995, Carabine, 2001, 
Dunn, 2009, Fairclough, 2003, Graham, 2005, Hall, 2001, Hansen, 2006, Kaarhus, 
1999, Kendall and Wickham, 1999, May, 1993, Neumann, 2001, Neumann, 2009, 
Sandberg, 2006, Tamboukou, 1999, Vucetic, 2011, Wetherell et al., 2001) 
  
The approach described in “The Archeology of Knowledge states: “to describe 
statements, to describe the enunciative function of which they are the bearers, to 
analyze the conditions in which this function operates, to cover the different domains 
that this function presupposes and the ways in which these domains are articulated” 
(Foucault, 1972). This is also the kernel of the analytical approach undertaken here. 
However, it is important to specify that Foucault used this approach in his early works 
and it was to be revised later on. In his studies on madness, the clinic or the penal 
system the analytical tools used are specifically conceived according to the discipline 
he is focusing on and not tied in to pre-determined theories or methodology (Gutting, 
2003). In this way it can be said that the object of study informs and shapes the 
methods used by Foucault. 
 
In this thesis and based on the above-mentioned description, the methods outlined by 
L. Hansen and J. Carabine (Carabine, 2001, Hansen, 2006) will be used. Based on 
these guidelines, we will conduct a historical review of the context from which the 
present understanding of truth commissions has crystallized (chapter 4) and we will 
analyze the document tool -discursive strategy (chapter 5).  
The steps to be taken to unearth the discursive strategy are as follows:  
 
Context 
• Identify the context 
• Way the problem is articulated 
• How it is presented and discussed 
• Solutions recommended 
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• Silences – absences: Are there any issues that should be discussed but are 
not? Were other discourses on the issue of truth commissions 
marginalized? Which?  
 
Define the Truth Commission discourse 
• Choice and limitation of discourse -­‐ How it is presented and discussed -­‐ Solutions recommended 
• Silences – absences 
• Inter-relationships between discourses (process of cross-referencing): For 
example: what ideas about democracy or liberalism inform the discourse? 
• Counter-discourses: Are there any? 
• Discourse materiality: Non-discursive practices (policies and truth 
commissions) 
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4. ANALYSIS I 
 
The main object of analysis of this thesis is constituted by the UN truth commission 
discourse. This discourse is partially materialized in a policy document called Rule of 
Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Truth Commissions (HR/PUB/06/1), which is meant 
to “provide practical guidance to field missions and transitional administrations in 
critical transitional justice and rule of law-related areas” (Foreword). 
 
Through a genealogical analysis, the thesis seeks to identify the relations between the 
UN discourse on truth commissions and the specific constructions that articulate it, 
such as the right to know/truth and the right to justice. As we shall see, these 
discursive constructions inform both the discourse of truth commissions and the 
discourse of transitional justice in general.  
 
The analysis will proceed first by describing some aspects of the contexts from which 
these discursive constructions (right to know/truth and right to justice) emerge. 
Secondly, it will analyse the UN discourse on truth commissions and it will close by 
defining what are the consequences of this specific articulation.  
  
4.1. CONTEXT ANALYSIS 
Within the United Nations, truth commissions are defined as “official, temporary, non-
judicial fact-finding bodies that investigate a pattern of abuses of human rights or 
humanitarian law committed over a number of years” (Secretary General, 2004). 
Although this definition specifically mentions the non-judicial character of the 
mechanism, in the paragraphs above we pointed out that the discourse on truth 
commissions is also articulated around the discourse of human rights (right to 
know/truth and right to justice). These two rights have been understood as 
representing a justice versus peace dilemma because in highly charged situations of 
regime change, it´s assumed that political compromises are needed (which may defer 
the search for criminal accountability). This seeming paradox can be clarified by 
looking into the historical context from which the rights that sustain the UN definition of 
truth commissions arise.  
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4.1.1. The Right to Know 
The UN published the policy document Rule of Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: 
Truth Commissions (HR/PUB/06/1) in 2006. This tool represents the “increased need 
to work quickly and effectively to re-establish the rule of law and the administration of 
justice in post- conflict missions” (Preface). It also reflects a “renewed” General 
Assembly´s interest in rule of law issues, which has been strengthened steadily since 
1992 when the subject was introduced as a permanent agenda item in the sessions47.  
 
Now, having asserted that the rule of law is the backbone of a healthy-functioning 
democracy and of the international legal order that the UN advocates48, how can it 
promote the need or desirability of truth commissions that are non-judiciary 
mechanisms to establish accountability? Which principles do you invoke? The 
organization´s answer has been to anchor the desirability of truth commissions in the 
so-called natural need of human beings of finding out about the fate of missing family 
members and their whereabouts. This need has been morally and legally translated as 
the Right to Know or the Right to Truth. 
 
Different authors have asserted that the right to know has its origins in the Genève 
Convention, which is the body of international law that regulates the conduct of armed 
conflict and seeks to limit its effects (Mendez 1997, Orentlicher 2004). Yet, what these 
authors refer to is not properly the Geneve Convention as such, whose latest version 
dates from 1949, but to the Additional Protocol I which entered into force in 1977. This 
protocol was decreed in order to regulate conflicts related to “colonial domination, alien 
occupation or racist regimes”(art.1 Par.4) which were very salient during the 70´s 
(when the Protocol was established) and it states in the article 33, Paragraph 1st, that: 
“As soon as circumstances permit, and at the latest from the end of active hostilities, 
each Party to the conflict shall search for the persons who have been reported missing 
by an adverse Party. Such adverse Party shall transmit all relevant information 
concerning such persons in order to facilitate such searches” and Art 32 (Guiding 
Principle) “The right of families to know the fate of their relatives”. The responsibility to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  See	  http://www.un.org/en/ruleoflaw/index.shtml).	  Site	  accessed	  Nov.	  12,	  2012	  48	  See	  Millenium	  Declaration	  (2000)	  ”(We	  resolve)	  To	  strengthen	  respect	  for	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  in	  international	  
as	   in	   national	   affairs	   and,	   in	   particular,	   to	   ensure	   compliance	   by	  Member	   States	  with	   the	   decisions	   of	   the	  
International	  Court	  of	   Justice,	   in	  compliance	  with	  the	  Charter	  of	   the	  United	  Nations,	   in	  cases	  to	  which	  they	  
are	  parties”	  (Paragraph	  9)	  	  (A/RES/55/2)	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provide information about the fate of missing persons was explained as a moral duty of 
the conflicting parties (presumably the State) and a natural right owed to the family 
members.  
 
4.1.1.1. On Enforced Disappearances 
In 1992, this natural right to know the fate of the relatives was further expanded in 
connection with the Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Enforced 
Disappearances49, which seeks to “characterize all acts of enforced disappearance of 
persons as very serious offences and sets forth standards designed to punish and 
prevent their commission”50.	   This	   declaration came as a result of the deep concern 
over the widespread practice of “disappearing” people (alleged terrorists or political 
activists), that during the 70´s and 80`s had become standard practice within the 
authoritarian regimes then existing in several Latin American countries (and 
particularly in Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay). 
 
The practice of disappearing people had been documented and followed up by the 
Working Group on Involuntary and Enforced Disappearances since 1980 when the UN 
Commission on Human Rights established the group. The declaration basically 
reinforces the duty of the state to provide information on the whereabouts of the 
disappeared and to clarify the facts to their family members, see following articles: 
“Accurate information on the detention of such persons and their place or places of 
detention, including transfers, shall be made promptly available to their family 
members, their counsel or to any other persons having a legitimate interest in the 
information (…)” (Art. 10, Para. 2) (emphasis added) 
“Acts constituting enforced disappearance shall be considered a continuing offence as 
long as the perpetrators continue to conceal the fate and the whereabouts of persons 
who have disappeared and these facts remain unclarified”  (Art.17, Para.1) 
(emphasis added) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  This	  declaration	  was	  adopted	  by	  the	  General	  Assembly	  (Resolution	  47/133)	  in	  Dec	  1992	  and15	  years	  later	  became	  the	  International	  Convention	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  All	  Persons	  from	  Enforced	  Disappearances	  (adopted	  in	  2006,	  entered	  into	  force	  in	  2010).	  50	  Document	  accessed	  on	  Nov.	  9th,	  2012	  (http://www.unrol.org/doc.aspx?d=2257)	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However, there is a difference between the duty to provide information as to the 
whereabouts of the disappeared and finding the facts surrounding the event, to the 
present day understanding of the right to know/truth. In the UN, parallel to the 
development of reports and resolutions regarding the issue of enforced 
disappearances with its roots in international humanitarian law51 (Genève Convention 
& Additional Protocols) another thread on the subject of impunity for these crimes was 
being developed at the same time. 
 
4.1.1.2. On Impunity 
Trials as accountability mechanisms for perpetrators of massive crimes had first been 
conducted at Nuremberg and Tokyo, after World War II, when a new vocabulary of 
“crimes against humanity” and “genocide” was to be asserted, as well as the possibility 
of holding individuals accountable, instead of the state, “The tribunals also established 
important principles of international justice, such as the responsibility of heads of state, 
the rejection of the infamous “I was just following orders” excuse, the weakening of 
retroactivity as a defense against crimes of mass atrocity, and the right of war 
criminals to a fair trial “ (p.2) (Eisikovits, 2011). 
 
However the antecedent created at Nuremberg refers primarily to inter-state wars. As 
for the crimes against humanity committed by the state against its own citizens as part 
of internal conflicts, not much had been done after Nuremberg52 until the entry in force 
in 1998 of the Roma Statute (who gave rise to the International Criminal Court). 
Nevertheless before the Rome Statute was signed, a seminal report written by Louis 
Joinet (Special Rapporteur of the then Sub-Commission on Prevention and 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities) on the question of impunity of perpetrators 
of human rights violations had been written and presented to the Commission of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  “International	  humanitarian	  law	  is	  a	  set	  of	  rules	  which	  seek,	  for	  humanitarian	  reasons,	  to	  limit	  the	  effects	  
of	  armed	  conflict.	  It	  protects	  persons	  who	  are	  not	  or	  are	  no	  longer	  participating	  in	  the	  hostilities	  and	  restricts	  
the	  means	  and	  methods	  of	  warfare.	  International	  humanitarian	  law	  is	  also	  known	  as	  the	  law	  of	  war	  or	  the	  
law	  of	  armed	  conflict.”	  International	  Committee	  of	  the	  Red	  Cross	  
(http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/6t7g86.htm)	  Webpage	  accessed	  on	  Nov.	  9th,	  2012	  52	  Although	  not	  much	  had	  been	  done	  in	  terms	  of	  legislation,	  a	  lot	  had	  been	  discussed	  during	  all	  those	  decades	  until	  the	  conflicts	  that	  emerged	  	  in	  former	  Yugoslavia	  in	  1992,	  	  put	  pressure	  on	  the	  drafting	  of	  a	  final	  law	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  International	  Criminal	  Court.	  See	  Rome	  Statute	  website	  	  http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/general/overview.htm	  (accessed	  Nov.	  9th,	  2012)	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Human Rights in 199753. This report will offer an original conception of the right to 
know which will comprise three principles:  
Principle 1 - The inalienable right to the truth 
Principle 2 - The duty to remember 
Principle 3 - The victim´s right to know.  
L. Joinet further explains: “This is not simply the right of any individual victim or closely 
related persons to know what happened, a right to the truth. The right to know is also a 
collective right, drawing upon history to prevent violations from occurring in the 
future. It´s corollary is a duty to remember, which the State must assume, in order to 
guard against the perversions of history that go under the names of revisionism or 
negationism; the knowledge of the oppression it has lived through is part of a people´s 
national heritage and as such must be preserved. These, then, are the main objectives 
of the right to know as a collective right” (p.5) (emphasis added) (Joinet, 1997)  
 
L. Joinet never mentions in his study the Genève Convention or the Additional 
Protocol I, which assumedly are the origins of the right to know; furthermore he 
differentiates the need to provide information concerning missing persons from the 
right to the know – duty to remember - that he claims is more of a collective right. This 
emphasis in the collective dimension of the right to know, was previously absent 
from UN documentation, and will be employed subsequently to substantiate one of the 
main objectives of a truth commission, that of explaining not only the what´s, but the 
why´s of a troubled past.  
 
However, Joinet´s report was prepared in the context of a study on impunity. In his 
explanation as to the background of the report, he states that its origin were the 
amnesty laws for political prisoners that in the early 80´s were being proposed in 
different countries (Uruguay, Brazil and Paraguay) to “safeguard the promotion of 
human rights” and turned out to be an “insurance on impunity” when over the course of 
peace negotiations or regime change “an unattainable balance between the former 
oppressors desire for everything to be forgotten and the victims quest for justice” 
collapsed (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.1, page 3). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  L.	  Joinet	  explains	  that	  the	  genesis	  of	  the	  study	  dates	  back	  to	  1985	  when	  working	  as	  a	  UN	  Rapporteur	  on	  Amnesty	  he	  prepared	  a	  report	  on	  	  ”Amnesty	  Laws	  and	  their	  Role	  in	  the	  Safeguard	  and	  Promotion	  of	  Human	  
Rights”.	  His	  1997	  study	  on	  impunity	  draws	  partially	  on	  that	  earlier	  report.	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The need to avoid impunity with regard to human rights violations and to establish the 
truth of the facts surrounding these crimes lead to his recommendation of establishing 
extrajudicial commissions of inquiry54. Yet, this recommendation immediately brings 
out two things to the forefront: the human rights violations to be punished are civil and 
political - as stated in the title of the study- and the extrajudicial character of the 
inquiry. 
 
4.1.1.3. On Human Rights Violations: Civil and Political Rights vs. Economical, 
Social and Cultural Rights 
The focus on violations of civil/political rights was due to the fact that the General 
Assembly in its 46th session (1994) decided to split the study of impunity in two55: L. 
Joinet was left in charge of the civil/political rights area and El Hadji Guisse would 
assume the part of the human rights violations of economical, social and cultural 
rights.  
 
The division of human rights into civilian/political rights, also called first generation 
rights, and social/economical/cultural rights, or second-generation rights has been 
cause to a great deal of friction in the history of human rights56. In her article on the 
indivisible framework of human rights, Rhonda Copelon57 asserts that all human rights 
are inseparable and interdependent “These (rights) are inseparable and 
interdependent in that the opportunity to exercise liberty will influence the production 
and distribution of food, at the same time as hunger is antithetical to the enjoyment of 
liberty and full participation in society” (p.216). Choosing to emphasize some rights 
above others, illustrates once more the intense discussions faced in 1949 by the 
commission behind the Universal Declaration of the Human Rights, which prompted 
Eleanor Roosevelt (Chair of the Commission) to assert “You can´t talk civil rights to 
people who are hungry” (Copelon, 1998).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  No	  mention	  of	  the	  words	  Truth	  Commissions	  in	  this	  1997	  report	  55	  As	  explained	  by	  L.	  Joinet	  in	  his	  final	  report	  on	  impunity	  (p.4)	  JOINET,	  L.	  1997.	  Question	  of	  Impunity	  of	  Perpetrators	  of	  Human	  Rights	  Violations	  (Civil	  and	  Political).	  In:	  UNITED	  NATIONS,	  O.	  H.	  C.	  H.	  R.	  (ed.)	  
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.1.	  56	  For	  further	  information	  see	  theoretical	  chapter	  the	  part	  on	  human	  rights	  57	  US	  lawyer	  specialized	  in	  international	  human	  rights	  and	  who	  played	  a	  major	  role	  in	  several	  groundbreaking	  cases	  in	  US	  courts.	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These are exactly the points raised by El Hadji Guisse in his report of 1997 (which is 
parallel to Joinet´s report) on the impunity of perpetrators of economic, social and 
cultural right violations. This reports describes as contemporary violations: “Violations 
of economic, social and cultural rights are national or international. The following are 
examples of international practices that give rise to serious violations of economic, 
social and cultural rights: debt, structural adjustment programs, deterioration of terms 
of trade, corruption, laundering of drug money, the fraudulent activities of transnational 
corporations, etc. Violations committed on national territory, most of which are 
considered to be justiciable offences, include: misappropriation of public funds, misuse 
of company assets, corruption, tax and customs evasion, financial speculation, 
fraudulent or unlawful enrichment, exploitation of illegal labor and migrant workers, 
etc.” (Emphasis added)(Para.31, p.10)(Guisse, 1997) 
 
However, violations of economical, social and cultural rights are not only difficult to be 
accounted for, but even less to be repaired for; specially when there are still 
discussions about the conceptual basis of such rights (Sen, 2004) or when the 
“traditional legal remedies such as court actions are either inappropriate or at best 
impracticable for the vindication of ESR (economic and social rights)” (parentheses 
added) (p. 313)(Steiner et al., 2008). 
 
The point to be raised, though, is that for the purposes of our discussion on transitional 
justice/truth commissions the human rights offenses to be accounted for are of a 
civilian/political character. Joinet´s study - which in many way delineates the UN 
standard- follows a normative trend that has crystallized around the notion that 
democracy is to be achieved by focusing in legal-institutional development, without 
much reference to socioeconomic conditions and structural changes in society (Paige, 
2009). The absence of these rights from later discussions on transitional justice and 
truth commissions embody the foucauldian silences, that is those issues that for 
different reasons were marginalized from the official debate.  
 
4.1.1.4. On the Non-Judiciary Nature of Inquiries 
Joinet´s influential report based on a “comparative analysis of past and present 
commissions experiences” comments on the proposed extrajudicial nature of the 
inquiry: “unless they are handing down summary justice, which has too often been the 
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case in history, the courts cannot mete out swift punishment to torturers and their 
masters” (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.1, page 5). It could be argued it to be an 
inconsistent assertion to recommend non-judicial inquiries in cases regarding impunity 
and claiming for accountability, yet at this point the objectives of such inquiries were 
believed to be (Joinet 1997:5): 
• Dismantling of the machinery which has allowed criminal behaviour (…) in order 
to secure non-recurrence  
• Preserve evidence for the courts 
• Rehabilitate credibility of human rights advocates 
The re/establishment of rule of law, which is to be one of the ultimate aims of 
present transitional justice mechanism, is mentioned with circumspection “Restrictions 
may be applied to certain rules of law in order to support efforts to counter impunity. 
The aim is to prevent the rules concerned from being used to benefit impunity”58 
(Joinet 1997:8) 
 
Much has been discussed in this regard, arguments in favour of extra-judicial inquiries 
range from their practicality in cases of massive human rights violations involving 
thousands of offenders (a la Rwanda style), to their ability to facilitate more truthful 
accounts and investigations, to debates as to whether justice should be retributive vs. 
restorative (a la South Africa style). On the other hand, arguments presently run in the 
order that an integrated approach combining trials, truth commissions and/or the other 
mechanisms contemplated in the transitional justice repertoire is the best chance to 
achieve accountability and promote the rule of law (De Greiff, 2012). 
 
Yet, back in 1997, Joinet explains that the purpose of the inquiry is basically to 
establish the facts and to advance the duty to remember (both part of the right to 
know) and this is separated from the right to justice. The three rights that are the basis 
of the Transitional Justice field (Truth, Justice and Reparation) although acknowledged 
to be interdependent are to be divided and prioritized according to the circumstances. 
 
The rights and principles described by Joinet would serve as the basis for further work 
in the area of impunity when D. Orentlicher writes in 2004 an updated version of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  Joinet	  here	  is	  referring	  to	  amnesty	  laws,	  right	  to	  asylum,	  trial	  in	  absentia,	  due	  obedience,	  extradition,	  prescription,	  legislation	  on	  repentance	  and	  military	  courts	  (p.	  9)	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Joinet´s principles: “Independent study on best practices and recommendations to 
assist states in combating impunity” (E/CN.4/2004/88). Orentlicher will emphasize 
again the individual and collective dimensions of the right to know thus providing 
more justification of the practice of truth commissions, which would represent a 
mechanism to allegedly ensure, among other things, the fulfilment of the collective 
dimension of the right. She builds up her case by referring to the way the right has 
developed by being affirmed and delineated by different human rights treaties and 
supervisory bodies such as the American Convention on Human Rights, European 
Court of Human Rights, Inter-American Court and so on. Furthermore, she announces 
that what was previously known as “commissions of inquiry” or “extrajudicial 
commissions of inquiry” would be revised, in her study, to “truth commissions”, “The 
revised text introduces the phrase truth commissions, a particular type of commission 
of inquiry, in view of their increasing importance as a mechanism for exercising the 
right to know” (p.7, para.14) (emphasis added)(Orentlicher, 2004) 
 
However, even though both Orentlicher and Joinet refer to the right to know as a right 
and a principle, there is a caveat to their conclusions “these principles are not legal 
standards in the strict sense, but guiding principles” (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.1, 
para. 49), and “guidelines that are not legally binding in themselves should 
nonetheless reflect and comport with pertinent legal standards” (E/CN.4/2005/102, 
para.11). Without more elaboration as to how this imprecise legal status may impact or 
not its enforcement, the right to know will continue to become the focus of further UN 
studies and reports. 
 
4.1.1.5. On the Right to the Truth 
By 2006 the Study on the Right to the Truth and the Rule of Law Tools for Post-
Conflict States: Truth Commissions (both prepared by the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights59), have not only advocated for the legal status of the 
rights integral to the practice of truth commissions (right to know, right to justice and 
right to reparations), but, interestingly enough, the expression “right to the truth” will 
come to substitute that of the “right to know”. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  Document	  E/CN.4/2006/91	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While Joinet´s report from 1997 mentions the right to the truth as one of the principles 
of the Right to Know60, the central idea both in his report and in further reports 
(Orentlicher) and resolutions within the UN system before 2006, is to refer to the Right 
to Know. Without going into deep semantical discussions as to the difference between 
a right to know versus a right to the truth, it was not possible to locate within the UN 
documentation any reference as to why this sudden change of wording. However, a 
brief discussion into this issue will be taken up in the analysis of the document Rule of 
Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Truth Commissions. 
 
Presently, the right to the truth or right to know has become a de facto right in the UN 
system and not just a moral priority. The right to know about the fate of relatives and 
circumstances surrounding their disappearance/death/torture can be convincingly 
argued to be an ethical demand. Nevertheless it is not completely clear that a 
collective dimension is ineludibly attached to it and that this is required for non-
recurrence, peace or reconciliation, indeed some legal researchers question the 
conceptual standing of such right,  “It may be argued that the right to the truth stands 
somewhere on the threshold of a legal norm and a narrative device. Its clear link to 
human dignity means that nobody will deny its importance, but lingering doubts about 
its normative content and parameters leave it somewhere above a good argument and 
somewhere below a clear legal rule.” (p.273) (Naqvi, 2006) 
 
4.1.2. The Right to Justice 
The right to justice has been continuously invoked alongside the right to know and the 
right to reparations, whenever dealing with issues of transitional justice and truth 
commissions. Although the challenge of justice is probably as old as civilization itself 
and there are many ways to articulate justice, whether on individual terms, collective 
justice, justice as fairness and so on; within the already mentioned seminal report from 
Joinet (1997), justice is articulated in terms of criminal prosecution and victims redress 
(as you would probably expect from a report on impunity). Specifically the right to 
justice is understood as:  
• The right of the victims to a fair and effective remedy (trials and reparations) 
• The duty of a state to prosecute impunity  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  In	  the	  previous	  descrition	  of	  the	  Right	  to	  Know	  are	  mentioned	  the	  other	  principles	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Joinet further states “there can be no effective and lasting reconciliation without an 
effective response to the need for justice” (p.7, para. 26), Thus not only reaffirming a 
position within the debate as to the aims of justice in times of regime change - i.e. the 
justice versus peace dilemma- but also stating that reconciliation (which by 1997 had 
already been set up as an objective to be achieved in several truth commissions) as 
part of the understanding of peace.  
 
In the context of impunity for human rights violations (civil/political), both Joinet´s 
report and Orentlicher´s follow-up, articulate a clear need for criminal prosecution. In 
fact, reflecting retrospectively on her work on the subject Orentlicher would comment 
on this paradigm of impunity, “I am widely associated with a view that is supportive of 
a strong international duty to prosecute past abuses (though, as I will explain, many 
attributions of this position hardly correspond to my actual views) (…) I wish to make 
clear, however, that I do not consider this to be in principle the most urgent or 
important issue of transitional justice, although it may be just that in some societies” 
(p.11)(emphasis added) (Orentlicher, 2007).  
 
By 2004, the crimes committed by the state and other political actors in conflict and 
post-conflict societies were understood as a broader type of challenge. While 
previously the problem was explained by referring to the amnesty laws (prevalent 
particularly in Latin America) that gave exiting dictatorships impunity over the crimes 
committed, when the Secretary General (Kofi Anan) presents his report on “The Rule 
of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies”, the main 
problem was partially defined as a “rule of law vacuum evident in so many post-conflict 
societies” which lead him to assert that “the consolidation of peace in the immediate 
post-conflict period, as well as the maintenance of peace in the long term cannot be 
achieved unless the population is confident that redress for grievances can be 
obtained “(p.3, para.3) (emphasis added) (Annan, 2004). In other words, securing 
some type of accountability (whether in trials, commissions, vetting and so on) for the 
crimes committed becomes the high road to peace and the need to establish a 
coherent approach including all transitional justice mechanisms as equally relevant is 
seen as crucial. 
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Although Kofi Anan in his 2004 report recognizes the relevance of addressing the 
common root causes of conflict (economic/social inequality, power abuse, denial of 
citizenship, etc.), these can only be properly addressed “in a legitimate and fair 
manner”, that is by establishing first a functioning, coherent and legitimate judiciary 
system, other more structural type of changes could be attempted. In other words, the 
rule of law - or rather its break down - becomes both the cause of the problem 
(explanatory cause) and the objective of the initiative. Therefore we have a situation 
when apparently common sets of problems in different countries (massive crimes – 
usually involving the state as the major actors- followed by regime change) are 
understood under the same discourse (human rights violations/break down of the rule 
of law) and the range of solutions is limited accordingly (re-establishment rule of law 
which leads to peace and democracy). 
 
This specific understanding of justice becomes reinforced in further UN 
documentssuch as the Secretary General Report (A/61/636-S/2006/980) wherein is 
emphasized “the importance and urgency of the restoration of justice and the rule of 
law in post-conflict societies, not only to come to terms with past abuses, but also to 
promote national reconciliation and to help prevent a return to conflict” (p3, 
para.1) (emphases added) (Annan, 2006).  
 
Since 2008 the Secretary General has presented to the Security Council yearly reports 
on the UN rule of law engagement in the maintenance of peace and security including 
the different mechanisms of transitional justice. In fact, the rule of law discourse seems 
to gain more and more ascendancy, “In the seven years since that report (Kofi Anan´s 
report of 2004), the United Nations has marshaled significant international attention to 
the importance of the rule of law at the national and international levels” (p.3, para.3) 
(parentheses added) (Ki-moon, 2011) 
 
Yet, while the general area of transitional justice is, within the UN system, headed 
towards a more integrated engagement with the rule of law framework, there has been 
not much discussion of the already mentioned El Hadji Guisse (1997) report on 
economic, social and cultural rights violations, even though those violations also 
represent a breakdown of the rule of law. Moreover, according to M. Martinez-Soliman 
(Deputy Director of UNDP's Bureau for Development Policy), “Every year, corruption is 
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estimated to cost more than 5% of global GDP (US$2.6 trillion) (…) Widespread rent-
seeking and patronage have the power to undermine democracy and the rights of 
communities”61.  Economic crimes such as corruption or financial speculation, as 
Guisse so eloquently expressed, are serious violations of human rights and interact 
with other factors (such as inequality or poverty, for example) to give rise to many 
violent conflicts.  
 
While many UN initiatives to combat economic crimes have been created (see for 
example UN Convention against Corruption62 among others) and descriptions of 
these violations have been produced63, violations of economic, social and cultural 
rights have not been directly included within the sphere of transitional justice. As of 
2007, Louise Arbour, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, asserted that: “In 
spite of many achievements and occasional exceptions, transitional justice has, like 
mainstream justice, not yet dealt with economic, social, and cultural rights adequately 
or systematically. I suggest that transitional justice should take up the challenges to 
which mainstream justice is reluctant to rise: acknowledging that there is no hierarchy 
of rights and providing protection for all human rights, including economic, social, and 
cultural rights. As with all other human rights, economic, social, and cultural rights call 
for constitutional protection, legislative promotion, and judicial enforcement”(Arbour, 
2007).  
 
However, this approach could be changing. Beginning in 2010, the Secretary 
General has included in his latest reports on transitional justice and the rule of law 
(Ban Kin Moon 2010, 2011) a new guiding principle that states the “need to take into 
account of the root causes of conflicts and the related violations of all rights, including 
civil, political, economical, social and cultural rights” (p.3)(Ki-moon, 2010a), see also 
“festering grievances based on violations of economic and social rights are 
increasingly recognized for their potential to spark violent conflict” (p.14, para.51) (Ki-
moon, 2011). While one may wonder how novel is the insight about the conflict 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  UNDP	  website	  accessed	  	  Nov.	  20th,	  2012:	  	  
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourperspective/ourperspectivearticles/2012/11/07/optimis
m-in-the-field-of-anti-corruption-magdy-mart-nez-soliman/#	  62	  UN	  website	  accessed	  Nov	  20th,	  2012	  http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-­‐14&chapter=18&lang=en	  63	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  OHCHR	  Fact	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  #	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  2012	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arousing potential of economic and social grievances, a new link between the 
realization of economic and social rights and transitional justice mechanism has been 
forged within the UN system, “The United Nations must promote dialogue on the 
realization of economic and social rights, and provide concrete results through 
transitional justice mechanisms, legal reform, capacity-building, and land and identity 
registration efforts, among other initiatives” (idem p.15, para.52). 
 
4.1.3. Discursive Context 
The historical account detailed here represents, inevitability, a partial interpretation of 
the complex reality that within the UN system conforms the discursive context of the 
transitional justice/truth commission field. As explained, the account is built around key 
documents that in the last two decades have articulated a discourse on human rights, 
particularly the right to know/truth and the right to justice. The progressive articulation 
of these two rights provides a raison d´être to the transitional justice/truth commission 
discourse. As we have seen, this articulation while constant has not been 
straightforward or has progressed along a unidirectional path. Other possible 
articulations of transitional justice/truth commissions, for example the one that raises 
accountability claims around distributive justice issues were marginalized until recently 
(year 2010) when the issue of the violation of economic, social and cultural rights has 
been mentioned again, albeit in very general terms.  
 
On the other hand what was initially a crusade about impunity versus accountability, 
becomes a full-fledged transitional justice “field”. This field, articulated in a language of 
rights, is now embedded into a system wide effort to unify and strengthen a rule of law 
discourse that is expected to channel all efforts on peace and security supported by 
the UN. As expressed by the Secretary General in two of his last reports on the 
subject: 
“Rule of law initiatives are indispensable to international peace and security. In conflict 
and post-conflict settings the United Nations assists countries in establishing the rule 
of law by ensuring accountability and reinforcing norms, building confidence in justice 
and security institutions, and promoting gender equality” (Summary) (Ki-moon, 2011) 
“The rule of law is central to the vision of the Secretary- General for the coming five 
years, and must guide our collective response to a fast- changing world” (p.2 
para.1)(Ki-moon, 2012) 
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“Respect for the rule of law at the international and national levels is central to 
ensuring the predictability and legitimacy of international relations, and for delivering 
just outcomes in the daily life of all individuals. While responsibility for strengthening 
the rule of law lies with Member States and their citizens, the United Nations is ideally 
placed to support Member States’ efforts and to provide integrated and effective 
assistance”(Summary)(Ki-moon, 2012) 
 
Having presented this historical review, the next part will focus on the analysis of the 
UN official policy document “Rule of Tools for Post-Conflict States: Truth 
Commissions” (from now on RoL tool) and how it interacts with the discursive context 
just described. 
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5. ANALYSIS II 
 
5.1. UN Truth Commissions Definition 
 
5.1.1. Who are the “subjects” of truth commissions  
As mentioned in the previous context discussion, the policy document on truth 
commissions was published in 2006 in a period when an “interest” in rule of law issues 
had been rekindled in the UN64.  This interest fits the legalist approach of the tools, 
which through a language of rights seeks to define a way to manage post-conflict 
countries. These countries are explained as often suffering from “weak or non-existent 
rule of law, inadequate law enforcement and justice administration capacity, and 
increased instances of human rights violations” (Foreword) (OHCHR, 2006b).  
Although this first assumption would fit many countries wherein truth commissions 
have been conducted, many others would not fit at all. In fact, both the Argentinian and 
Chilean or even the South African truth commissions were established when the 
countries had fully functioning law enforcement and justice administration capacities, 
albeit acquiescent to the political elites. Other commissions have been established 
during peace time as part of the countries desire to understand conflictive events of a 
more distant past, see for example the cases of: Germany 1995 (Commission on the 
Consequences of the SED Dictatorship in the Process of German Unity), Panama, 
2001 (Panama´s Truth Commission), South Korea, 2005 (Presidential Truth 
Commission on Suspicious Deaths) 65 , Canada, 2012 (Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission66) or the independent-community led truth commission of Greensboro, 
USA (Truth & Reconciliation Commission)  of 200667.  In short, truth commissions are 
just as frequently established in peaceful, rule of law –functioning states as not. Yet 
this discourse tells us a truth wherein: “It is increasingly common for countries 
emerging from civil war or authoritarian rule to create a truth commission to operate 
during the immediate post-transition period” (Introduction)(OHCHR, 2006b) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	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5.1.2. The objectives of truth commissions: Collective Truth & Reconciliation 
 
Collective truth 
As described in chapter 4, the right to know was originally limited to information about 
the whereabouts of victims and circumstances surrounding the event and as such it 
formed part of the baggage of international humanitarian law. During the political 
transitions in Latin American throughout the 80´s and 90´s, a human rights discourse 
starts to gain ascendancy68 and the right to know the truth (highly relevant in the 
particular Argentinian and Chilean cases), begins to coalesce.  
 
One of the early claims adjudicated to truth commissions was its assumed ability to 
construct a narrative of the events (duty to remember) “guarding against the 
development of revisionist and negationist arguments” (p.17) (Joinet, 1997). This duty 
was further explained in the RoL tool as the right “to understand the extent and pattern 
of past violations, as well as their causes and consequences. The questions of why 
certain events were allowed to happen can be as important as explaining precisely 
what happened” (p.2)(OHCHR, 2006b). Based on the right to know the truth, and 
specifically its presumed collective dimension, truth commissions reports are 
expected to “help a society understand and acknowledge a contested or denied 
history” (idem, p.2), yet should they occupy themselves with a causal analysis which 
proposes to explain the historical sources of a conflict? Would they be the adequate 
arenas to do so? To begin with, a definition of truth must be provided, some truth 
commissions have tried to do so.  
 
The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission defined it thus, “Truth is an 
account that is trustworthy, ethically articulated, scientifically supported, inter-
subjectively contrasted, presented as narrative interpretation, empathically concerned 
and subject to constant improvement” (p. 73)(Garcia-Godos, 2008). Other 
commissions like the one from South Africa adopted a different approach and divided 
truth in different categories: factual or forensic truth, personal or narrative truth, social 
or dialogue truth, healing and restorative truth (Wilson, 2001). Yet another 	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commission took a more lyrical approach “The truth, the whole truth and nothing but 
the truth, as the oath goes. The overall truth and the specific truth, the radiant but 
quiet truth. The whole and its parts, in other words, the bright light shone onto a 
surface to illuminate it and the parts of this same surface lit up case by case, 
regardless of the identity of the perpetrators, always in the search for lessons that 
would contribute to reconciliation and to abolishing such patterns of behavior in the 
new society” El Salvador Truth Commission69.  
 
Undoubtedly, determining what is the truth is a high call and it becomes an even 
harder task if this constructed narrative is supposed to be part of the official history of 
a country explaining the broader pattern of events, the why´s and the what´s, as 
Garcia-Godos explains in an article on the Peruvian Truth Commission, “The 
conceptual framework and terminology employed to construct such official versions of 
the events have the potential to define real people as victims, perpetrators, heroes or 
villains (…) they determine who deserves praise and who deserves condemnation, 
who deserves reparation and who deserves prison, and who enters the history books 
and who remains forgotten” (p.63) (Garcia-Godos, 2008). 
 
Readied with variations of the motto “never again”, the discourse on truth commissions 
claims its own “truths”: that a historical narrative is the way to explain events, legitimize 
the suffering of the victims and avoid recurrence. While these might be desirable 
goals, the claim is not sustainable by itself if not accompanied by other complementary 
initiatives and even then, it is very difficult to achieve (as we read in the literature 
review). 
 
Reconciliation 
In the literature review was explained that within the research community there are no 
agreed upon conclusions as to the efficiency of truth-telling initiatives in achieving 
either reconciliation or healing in post-conflict societies, as to what exactly do we 
mean by reconciliation or whether that is a pre-condition for a peaceful future 
coexistence. The RoL tool is also careful to phrase this mechanism as advancing 
those aims, “It should not be assumed that such an inquiry will directly result in 	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  (http://www.usip.org/publications/truth-­‐commission-­‐el-­‐salvador)	  Accessed	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reconciliation either in the community or in the national or political sphere. 
Reconciliation is understood differently in different contexts” (idem, p.2). Yet other UN 
official documents are less restrained in their approach. For example, in the last three 
years, the Secretary-General´s reports to the UN General Assembly on rule of law 
activities (See p.9, para.39 (Ki-moon, 2009), p.7, para.21 (Ki-moon, 2011) and p. 14, 
para.41(Ki-moon, 2012), constantly refers that “judicial and non-judicial processes 
and mechanisms, based on national consultations that ensure accountability, serve 
justice and achieve reconciliation in the context of past large-scale abuses” (p.13, 
para.53)(Ki-moon, 2010b).  
 
Definitely appeals to reconciliation have an intuitive appeal (particularly to those not 
directly affected by the events), yet it can be argued whether this is not a religiously 
based notion, a Christian priority, that was specifically advocated by Archbishop D. 
Tutu during the South African Truth & Reconciliation Commission (1995) with mixed 
results (Wilson, 2001). Before the South African experience, although reconciliation 
may have been mentioned, it was referred to as a political reconciliation in the sense 
of achieving a relatively peaceful coexistence and not a forgiveness narrative that 
trades criminal accountability for emotional catharsis in the name of an assumed 
collective good. As indicated above, it seems that within the UN discursive context 
reconciliation continues to be a standard reference. As to whether ready-made notions 
like reconciliation constantly repeated have a direct bearing on a definition of 
discourse as the one presented in the theoretical chapter, we can propose that 
although the RoL tool does not claim a direct relationship between truth-telling and 
reconciliation, the discursive context which envelopes the document does so. If we 
recall from the theoretical chapter that statements are enunciative functions and not 
just a linguistic formulation, we could propose that the articulation - by an authoritative 
source (UN)- of a discourse partially built on the reconciliatory capabilities of truth 
commissions can help bring them into existence as a truth claim.  
 
5.1.3. Justice and the Rule of Law  
According to the RoL tool, truth commissions are defined as “officially-sanctioned, 
temporary, non-judicial investigative bodies (…) that offer some form of accounting for 
the past” (idem, p.1). Within the context of a system-wide UN effort to promote the rule 
of law as the midwife of peace, advocating for a non-judiciary form of accounting for 
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gross human rights violations seems a paradox. Although this fact has been partially 
explained by pointing to the complementarity of the mechanisms within the transitional 
justice package, this can also be understood (and has been explained) from other 
perspectives. First, as written in the document itself (foreword) as a practical means to 
deal with situations where: 
• The crimes are so massive that full criminal accountability is impossible or 
unlikely (Rwanda) 
• There has been a de facto (Peru) or de jure amnesty (Argentina and Chile) 
• There is lack of capacity in the judicial system  
Secondly, this understanding can be weighed against a background shaped by the 
alleged justice vs. peace dilemma, wherein due to the fragility of many newly 
established regimes a sort of compromise is proposed which prioritizes political 
interests above accountability demands which could jeopardize stability (Orentlicher, 
2007).  
 
This assumed pondering of the pros and cons of prosecutorial action in times of 
political change cannot be described as an either/or debate since truth commissions 
are justice mechanisms, they render justice to the victims, although in a different form. 
Wherein criminal trials represent the prototypical form of retributive justice, truth 
commissions as non-judiciary bodies are geared towards a kind of victim-centered 
restorative justice wherein people who were denied a “voice” (Godwin Phelps, 2001, 
Urban Walker, 2007) are given the possibility of a social space in the new society, 
“the work of a commission can help a society  understand and acknowledge a 
contested or denied history, and in doing so, bring the voices and stories of the 
victims, often hidden from public view, to the public at large”  (emphasis added) 
(idem, p.2). The non-judiciary form of accounting that truth commissions propose is 
assumedly not contradicting the desire to achieve justice since they not only may 
complement prosecutions, but also achieve themselves some form of justice.  
 
The emphasis on achieving some form of justice is embedded in wider discourse that 
of re-establishing the rule of law. A focus on the rule of law is supposed to be 
characteristic of democracies, which is the normative ideal towards which UN 
transitional justice efforts are aimed at. Thus it could be said that the rights discourse 
that is articulated through the documents on truth commissions in specific and 
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transitional justice in general, is part of a discursive formation which also includes the 
rule of law, as quoted in the theoretical chapter “Whenever these discursive events 
support a strategy (…) a common institutional or political pattern (…) they are said to 
belong to the same discursive formation” (Hall, 2001).  
 
 The rule of law is assumed to conjure away any specter of authoritarianism and to 
invoke the spirit of a democratic polity. This discourse influences how ideas are put 
into practice and defines and produces the objects of our knowledge. The truth claim 
constituted is that the fair-minded universe of the rule of law is to be preferred to that 
of the rule of men who with their unreliable instincts, and if fed on power, may develop 
into dictatorial despots. However, this truth claim has been contested. While it is 
correct to state that the objective of the rule of law is to set limits to power, some legal 
philosophers have asserted that this does not mean that a democratic system is 
necessarily the only outcome of this approach: “Among the many traits ascribed to the 
rule of law throughout its historical development, there did not seem to emerge a 
necessary relationship between the rule of law and a specific political and 
constitutional system: although there was a prevailing historical link between the rule 
of law and liberal constitutionalism, the twentieth- century development of the 
Rechtsstaat paved the way for different usages of the formula, for it has been referred 
also to the “Fascist state” or to the “welfare state” of the post–Second World War 
period” (p 135.)(Costa, 2007).   
 
The rule of law, as any discourse, cannot situate itself above or beyond historical or 
political circumstances. This does not disqualify its specific role in interacting with 
power, rather the critique is meant to demystify its boundless capabilities. This 
mystification is precisely what becomes problematic. When the discourse on the rule 
of law becomes the only legitimate understanding of justice, it marginalizes other 
possible local, national or religious understandings. Furthermore the rule of law 
discourse itself, by being historically situated, has meant different things at different 
points in time70. 
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This chapter presented an analysis of the UN definition of truth commission that, 
explained in the context chapter, is articulated around a discourse of rights (right to 
know/truth and right to justice). This is also a discourse articulated by an authoritative 
or “privileged speaker”, so to speak, as it comes from the UN. This authoritative 
position allows for the enunciation of certain truth claims, amongst them:  
• Truth commissions can construct a collective truth and achieve reconciliation 
• Truth commissions are an important tool for post-conflict countries 
• Truth commissions are an expression of justice that helps re-establish the rule 
of law 
A prominent absence, the violations of economic, social and cultural rights 
characterize this discourse. The marginalization of this counter-discourse has 
previously been mentioned in connection with the context discussion. Yet, while this 
absence it´s referred to in the document tool: “In some countries, economic crimes 
have been as prominent – and in the public´s mind as egregious- as the civil and 
political rights violations by a prior regime” (p.9)(OHCHR, 2006b), it is immediately 
explained by pointing to the complexities of engaging in such type of research: “Those 
drafting the mandate should be conscious of the dangers and difficulties of including 
economic crimes within a truth commission´s scope” (idem) (emphasis added). In 
short, this chapter aspires to argue how specific truths regarding the discursive and 
non-discursive practices of truth commissions are articulated, and how this articulation 
leaves out other possible understandings. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This thesis started by questioning what was the discourse underpinning the UN 
understanding of truth commissions, and how this specific articulation came about. 
However if I try to be a bit more accurate the thesis started before, it started by a 
personal curiosity in comprehending how knowing the truth about a crime could 
possibly be equated with justice. Although I later learned that truth commissions were 
one of the mechanisms of the transitional justice approach to achieve justice, I also 
learned that in many countries is the one and only mechanism established as a sort of 
compromise in between a change of political regimes. Of course, and as we have 
seen throughout the genealogical analysis hereby conducted, truth commissions are 
also spoken of as much more than a political compromise. Reconciliation, the re-
establishment of the rule of law, collective truth and so on, have also become claims 
for the advocacy of truth commissions. Yet these are all claims that have evolved over 
time, over the practice of specific truth commissions. 
 
According to analysis conducted, the UN understanding of truth commissions has also 
been articulated progressively. From the moral duty to provide information about the 
fate of missing persons at the end of an armed conflict, which was stated in the 
Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Convention in 1977, a right to know the truth and a 
right to justice have evolved in specific ways. The articulation has focused on certain 
aspects (violations of civil-political rights) and it has left outside others (socio-economic 
rights). Focusing only on civil-political rights violations, while assumedly more 
manageable in the context of a truth commission (and transitional justice in general) 
leaves out of the equation important root-causes of the armed conflict. In many of 
“post-conflict” countries were truth commissions are being recommended and/or 
carried out, the crimes were committed in order to suppress demands in the context of 
either socio-economic inequality and/or ethnic discrimination. While the final reports of 
some truth commissions have included recommendations to focus on socio-economic 
or ethnic challenges, or have addressed them in the report, the official policy 
document of the UN does not encourage the investigation of these types of violations 
– within the context of truth commissions- for reasons of timing, focus and 
methodological tools.  
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Further consequences of this articulation is that it represents a legalist approach to a 
potentially challenging political situation as a turbulent regime change or the end of an 
armed conflict, in what can be defined as the primacy of the law.  A change of regime 
within these contexts can be contained and managed by upholding the rule of law, 
which itself is the result of the new order and the ideal to strive for. It is assumed that a 
democratic order automatically follows the re-establishment of the rule of law and not 
the other way around, which can also be perfectly argued. As mentioned in the 
analysis, there is a mystification of what the law is or what it can achieve without an 
acknowledgement that the law is also susceptible to power interactions and 
interventions of a political or economical order. 
 
Another implication of the UN understanding of truth commissions is that truth itself is 
mystified. Representative experiences, since most of the times the whole universe of 
victims cannot be approached, carefully collated with factual evidence and research 
produce a collective true which can help historical understanding, provide societal 
reconciliation and personal healing (trough official recognition of victimhood). As 
discussed in the literature review, it is difficult to substantiate these claims. Yet, within 
the context of the UN understanding of both truth commissions and transitional justice, 
the claims continue to be advanced sometimes carefully worded (as in the policy 
document itself) and other times as a part of the official rhetoric (as in the reports of 
the Secretary General to the Security Council discussed in the analysis). 
 
This leads us to the last implication of the definition of UN truth commissions and 
which is the one that opened these conclusions: the search for truth understood as an 
act of justice. This understanding of justice can be argued to be a variation of the 
concept of restorative justice since it is victim-centered, in opposition to retributive 
justice that allegedly is focused on the offender and tends to be associated with 
punitive measures, or distributive justice that is concerned with the fair allocation of 
goods within a society.  Yet regardless of the understanding of justice, the important 
point to keep is that understandings are preferred readings of often-incommensurable 
demands. If we follow Foucault´s lead, the next step in the analysis would be to 
untangle the power interactions that help give rise and sustain these preferred 
readings.  An empirical analysis of a specific truth commission to uncover what 
Foucault termed the “micro-physics” of power, or within the context of the UN, an 
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analysis of the interactions between truth and power, how power is exercised, how 
does it work, could help us attain a richer picture of the discourse and practice of truth 
commissions.  
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